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After  the East Asian  crisis,  there  has  been  a  renewed  interest  in  both  academic  
and  policy circles about the role that bank weaknesses play  in contributing to 
systemic banking  crisis. Even though, it has been recognized in the recent theoretical 
literature on banking crises that both macroeconomic and bank-level fundamentals 
have to be taken into account in the  explanation  of  systemic  banking  crisis,  to  
date,  there  is  little  cross-country  empirical evidence for emerging markets on the 
role of bank weaknesses in contributing  to  both  sudden  deposit  withdrawals  and  
bank  failures.  In  this  context,  my thesis analyzes  the  episodes  of  systemic  
banking  crisis  in  Latin America  (Argentina,  1995; Mexico,  1994; and Venezuela,  
1994)  and  East  Asia  (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand in 
1997) using bank-level data in order to answer the  following  questions.  First,  to  
what  extent,  did  financial  conditions  of  individual  banks explain bank failures?  
Did only the weakest banks, in terms of their fundamentals, fail in the crisis  
countries?  Second,  did  depositors  in  crisis  countries  discipline  riskier  banks  by 
  
withdrawing their deposits in such a way that deposit withdrawals could be 
considered an act of market discipline? The results for East Asia and Latin America 
show that bank-level fundamentals  both  affect  significantly  the  likelihood  of  
failure and explain  a high proportion of the likelihood of failure of failed banks 
(around fifty percent). In East  Asian  crisis  countries,  there  was  little  overlap  in  
the  distribution  of  logit propensity scores between failed and non-failed banks, 
implying that mainly the weakest banks failed. However, in Latin American crisis 
countries, there was a much clear overlap in the distribution of  logit propensity 
scores,  implying  that  banking  system  and  macroeconomic shocks are relatively 
much more important in Latin America. Regarding market discipline, a stable model 
of bank-level fundamentals explains the growth rate of deposits in both regions even  
during the peak of the crisis periods. However,  in  both  regions,  the  relative  
contribution  of  bank  level fundamentals  during  the  peak  of  the  crisis  periods  
declined. In this  context, to some  degree, the  observed deposit  withdrawals  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, developed and developing countries have experienced significant 
episodes of systemic banking crises, which have been more costly in developing areas 
than in industrial economies; thus, the prevention of such recurrent episodes has become 
a priority of policy1. The most acute among the recent experiences are the financial 
problems in some emerging markets (EMs) during the nineties. These episodes have 
renewed the interest in academic and policy circles about both the role that individual 
financial institutions’ weaknesses play in contributing to bank failures, and the role that 
market discipline --the ability of depositors, stockholders, or creditors at large to penalize 
banks for bad (poor) performance by withdrawing their deposits or by requiring higher 
interest rates-- can play in prudential regulation by encouraging proper risk management 
by banks. In this context, my dissertation contributes to this debate by empirically 
addressing two main questions: (i) To what extent, did financial conditions of individual 
banks explain bank failures?  Did only the weakest banks, in terms of their fundamentals, 
fail in the crisis countries? (ii) Did depositors in crisis countries discipline riskier banks 
by withdrawing their deposits in such a way that deposit withdrawals could be considered 
an act of market discipline?  
                                                 
1 See Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999). Regarding the definition of banking crisis, I follow that 
given by Sundararajan and Baliño (1991): “… financial crisis is defined as a situation in which a 
significant group of financial institutions have liabilities exceeding the market value of their 






There are two main reasons to address these questions empirically. First, recent 
theoretical research on banking has stressed the role of bank-level fundamentals to 
explain both bank failures and depositor discipline. However, there is little cross-country 
empirical research at the bank-level that aims to test these hypotheses for EMs. Second, 
the answers to these questions are relevant for policy regarding financial regulation and 
supervision.  
 
During the last fifteen years, in particular after the East Asian crisis, there has been a 
significant increase in the theoretical literature on banking emphasizing that 
microeconomic factors related to bank-level fundamentals have to be taken into account 
in the explanation of the waves of bank failures and deposit withdrawals that characterize 
systemic banking crisis. One stream of this literature argues that the main source of bank 
failures rests on bank vulnerabilities due to bad managerial practices reflected in the 
deterioration of their portfolio and capital structure prior to the onset of the crisis,2 while 
unexpected systemic or macroeconomic shocks just unveil the underlying weakness of 
the financial institutions. Another stream in this literature argues that sharp deposit 
contractions reflect an act of market discipline, i.e., sudden deposit withdrawals during 
the crisis periods represent an informed market response to observable weaknesses in 
individual financial institutions (traceable to ex-ante bank characteristics).3  
                                                 
2 Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Chinn and Kletzer (2000), and Dekle and Kletzer (2001).  
 
3 Jacklin and Battacharya (1988), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Calomiris et al. (1991), 




However, even though there is an extensive theoretical literature on bank failures and 
depositor discipline, there is little cross-country empirical evidence using bank-level data 
on EMs to test the implications of these hypotheses.4 Most studies that analyze bank 
failures and depositors’ discipline at the bank level focus on the experience of the US 
commercial banking industry, even though most of the recent episodes of systemic 
banking crisis have not occurred in developed countries.5  
 
Understanding the causes or origins of bank failures and sudden deposit contractions has 
important policy implications. If bank failures reflect fundamental weaknesses rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 There are some exceptions. The study by Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (2001) investigates the 
occurrence of distress and closure decisions in the five East Asian crisis countries (Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) in order to assess the role of bank’s “connections”-
with industrial groups or influential families- in causing and resolving bank failures. Rojas-
Suarez (2001) evaluates an alternative set of indicators based on “markets that work” rather than 
just relying on accounting figures in four episodes of systemic banking crisis: East Asia (1997-
1998), Mexico (1994-1995), Venezuela (1994) and Colombia (1982). Martinez-Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) evaluate the presence of market discipline for the individual experiences of 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico. 
 
5 Whalen (1991), Cole and Gunther (1997), Calomiris (1995, 1997, 1998 and 2000), and 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) develop an empirical analysis of the role of bank fundamentals in 
different episodes of banking system problems in the U.S. [Great Depression (1930-1933), 
Southwest (1986-1992), Northeast (1991-1992), and California (1992-1993)]. The common 




depositor confusion in the face of asset value shocks, then policy should strengthen the 
financial regulation and supervision system, with emphasis on the set of financial ratios 
that reveals conditions conductive to bank failure, forming the basis of an early warning 
system. Regarding depositor discipline, if sudden deposit withdrawals are the result of 
market discipline actions where depositors assess bank specific risks, then the policy 
recommendation is to make banks’ financial information available to depositors both 
before and during the run, and to rely more on private market discipline rather than on 
full deposit insurance schemes, which reduce depositors’ incentives for bank monitoring 
and exacerbate the moral hazard problems reflected in excessive bank risk taking. 
However, if sudden deposit withdrawals are unrelated to banks’ portfolio risks then 
deposit insurance and other forms of liquidity provision might be considered as useful 
instruments to avoid the collapse of the banking system.  
 
The goal of my thesis is to fill the gap between theoretical hypotheses and empirical 
testing on bank failures and depositor discipline. I develop the first comparative study at 
the micro or bank-level of the recent episodes of systemic banking crisis in East Asia and 
Latin America. This allows me to identify and compare underlying patterns not only 
across countries but also across regions. My thesis goes beyond and complements 
existing empirical macro structural factors present at the origin of crisis.6 
 
                                                 
6 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Corsetti et al. (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Demigurc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1999, 2000). One exception is Honohan (1997), who analyze 




I assemble a comprehensive database of banks gathering, information on balance sheets 
and income statements on an annual basis for 14 EMs from the BankScope database and 
countries’ Financial Supervisory Agency Reports. As part of the contribution of the 
thesis, in the case of Latin America, I assemble a novel database gathering financial 
statements directly from Supervisory Financial reports. My dataset include eight 
countries from East Asia: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan; and six countries from Latin America: Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The time span of the data covers the years from 
1994 to 1999 for the East Asia sample and from 1992 to 1996 for the Latin America 
sample. These samples include the latest episodes of bank runs and failures in both East 
Asia and Latin America. 
 
After presenting a review of the existence of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
bank failures, Chapter 2 answers the first empirical question; to what extent the waves of 
bank failure in the recent episodes of systemic banking crisis in EMs during the nineties 
reflected a fundamental deterioration in bank-level conditions. First, I assess if bank-level 
heterogeneity is important for explaining cross-country bank failures, i.e., if crisis 
countries had weaker banks ex-ante than non-crisis countries rather than just had worse 
shocks ex-post. Second, based on the previous results, I evaluate the relative contribution 
of bank-level fundamentals in the likelihood of failure, which allow us to determine if 





In order to perform the first task, given a definition of bank failure, I perform a 
descriptive analysis to examine whether failed financial institutions were similar ex-ante 
to non-failed financial institutions. Mean tests of bank-level fundamentals are performed, 
including market-based indicators such as the rate of decline in bank’s deposits, the 
implicit interest rate paid on deposits and loans, and interest rate spreads prior to the 
onset of systemic crisis. Then, I estimate the probability of bank failure using a cross-
sectional multivariate logit model for East Asia and Latin America separately, including 
crisis and non-crisis countries. Finally, to evaluate the robustness of the cross-sectional 
logit results, I relax the assumption that the information used in the logit estimation 
accurately reflects unchanging cross-sectional differences in bank condition during the 
crisis periods by estimating a survival duration model separately for East Asia and Latin 
America for a window of time, using the same set of bank-level fundamentals, and also 
aggregate banking and macroeconomic variables, i.e., I include the time dimension in the 
estimation.  
 
Regarding the second task, I compute propensity scores, based on the cross-sectional 
logit results for individual financial institutions, using only bank-level fundamentals for 
failed and non-failed financial institutions to determine their relative contribution to the 
likelihood of failure. A distributional analysis of these scores will allow us to evaluate the 
degree of overlap between the distribution for failed and non-failed banks in the crisis 





After presenting a review of the existent theoretical and empirical literature on depositor 
discipline, and stylized facts surrounding the episodes of sudden deposit withdrawals in 
EMs during the last decade, Chapter 3 answers the second empirical question; did 
depositors react to bank level fundamentals in such a way that deposit withdrawals could 
be considered an action of market discipline in the crisis countries?  I conduct panel-data 
analysis to test both if riskier banks attract fewer deposits, and if they pay higher interest 
rates. The null hypothesis is that deposit withdrawals and deposit interest rates did not 
respond to observable weaknesses in individual financial institutions, traceable to ex-ante 
bank characteristics, and that deposit runs in the crisis countries were instead episodes of 
pure contagion (random withdrawals hypothesis). In addition, I also evaluate the 
contribution of bank’s fundamentals relative to banking system and macroeconomic 
variables. As a robustness test, I perform GMM estimations to correct for the presence of 
potential endogenous effects. 
 
Chapter 4 summarizes the conclusions and policy recommendations. On the whole, my 
thesis shows that bank-level fundamentals related to bank asset risk, solvency, liquidity 
and profitability explain significantly the probability of bank failure in East Asia and 
Latin America. This result support the view that failed banks in the recent systemic crisis 
in Emerging Markets during the nineties suffered from fundamental weaknesses in their 
asset quality, liquidity, and capital structures. Regarding the relative contribution of bank-
level fundamentals, as opposed to aggregate factors, bank-level fundamentals explain 
around fifty percent of the probability of failure of failed banks in the crisis countries in 




institutions with particular ex-ante characteristics that made them more vulnerable to 
failure ex-post, i.e., failed banks were predictable weaker ex-ante relative to non-failed 
banks.  
 
In the case of East Asian crisis countries, there was little overlapping in the distribution 
of propensity scores between failed institutions and non-failed institutions. This result 
implies that mainly the weakest institutions failed in the crisis countries, suggesting that 
the social costs of the unwarranted closure of solvent institutions (if any) must have been 
small. However, in the case of Latin American crisis countries, there was a much clear 
overlap in the distribution of aggregate scores between failed institutions and non-failed 
institutions, implying that banking system and macroeconomic shocks are relatively more 
important in Latin America than in East Asia. 
 
In terms of policy recommendation, my thesis suggests that financial system supervision 
should be strengthened, putting emphasis not only on traditional financial ratios 
associated with to the CAMEL-rating system, but also on market-based indicators 
(deposit interest rates), forming the basis of an early warning system. In addition, given 
that macroeconomic and banking system variables affect the probability and timing of 
bank failure, financial regulators could rely on stress testing analysis as part of a financial 
assessment program in order to assess the vulnerability of a portfolio to major changes in 
the macroeconomic environment, making risks more transparent by estimating the 





Regarding depositor discipline, my thesis shows that a stable model of bank-level 
fundamentals explains the growth rate of real deposits in East Asia and Latin America 
even during the peak of the crisis periods. This result suggests that depositors attempted 
to sort among ex-ante solvent and insolvent banks in the presence of asymmetric 
information regarding the effect of shocks to the value of bank assets. However, in both 
regions, the relative contribution of bank level fundamentals during the peak of the crisis 
periods declined, implying that banking system and macroeconomic shocks played an 
important role in the episodes of sudden deposit withdrawals, in particular in Latin 
America. In this context, to some degree, the observed deposit withdrawals represented 
an informed market response to observable weaknesses in individual financial institutions 
 
In terms of policy recommendation, financial regulators could rely more on elements of 
private market discipline (disclosure) as a complement to deposit insurance schemes, 
implying that the coverage of such schemes have to be limited in order to maintain or 
increase depositors’ incentives for bank monitoring and reduce moral hazard problems 
reflected in excessive bank risk taking. Financial institutions should be required to release 
general types of public information, including the capital held as a buffer against losses, 
risk exposures (credit, market, and operational), risk assessment and management 
processes, and the capital adequacy of the institutions, in order to allow market 








Chapter 2: Bank Fundamentals and Bank Failures 
 
2.1 Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
2.1.1 Review of the Theoretical Literature 
Economic downturns could bankrupt a proportion of borrowers putting banks in distress. 
Oviedo (2003) presents a model of business cycles in a small open economy in which 
aggregate risk produces sporadic bank failures in a world where banks intermediate 
inflows of capital, diversify away idiosyncratic firm risks, issue debt among international 
investors, and are subject to capital-adequacy regulation. In this context, economic 
downturns trigger a large ratio of poor project returns, reducing the value of the bank’s 
portfolios. Under some circumstances, recessions are severe enough that they produce 
insolvency of the banking system. On the other hand, aggregate liquidity shocks may 
provoke bank failures due to the inability of banks to honor their short-term debts. Chang 
and Velasco (1999, 2001) argue that if the banking system’s potential short-term 
obligations (demand deposits and foreign short-term debt) exceed its liquidation value, 
then a bank run equilibrium exists. In this model, runs may occur only if the banking 
system is illiquid; adverse expectations are not, by themselves, sufficient for a run to 
occur. In their framework, the more illiquid the banking system, the more vulnerable 
(fragile) it will be to exogenous shocks and shifts in expectations.7  
                                                 
7 Potential contagion effects are also considered in this view. Diamond and Rajan (2002) argue 




However, Gavin and Hausmann (1996) argue that aggregate shocks undermine the 
viability of financial institutions and create a crisis, but they do not completely explain 
banking crises. Bank failures result from the interaction of vulnerability and aggregate 
shocks.8 In their argument, “a bank is vulnerable when relatively small shocks to income, 
asset quality, or liquidity make the bank either insolvent or illiquid so that its ability to 
honor short term debts is brought into doubt” (p. 48). 
 
Why do banks become vulnerable? Alternative hypotheses have been proposed to explain 
bank failures putting emphasis on micro-level fundamentals. One major stream of the 
literature emphasizes that the main cause of bank failures rests on bad managerial 
practices, reflected in the deterioration of banks’ portfolio and capital structures before 
the onset of the crisis.  
 
Chinn and Kletzer (2000) and Dekle and Kletzer (2001) present a model of financial 
crises in EMs where the source of the financial crisis is found in the interaction between 
the microeconomics of private financial intermediation and government macroeconomic 
policies. The emphasis on vulnerability of the banking sector bears much in common 
                                                                                                                                                 
but also because bank failures could lead to a contraction in the common pool of liquidity, and 
this negative spillover effect raises the likelihood of failure of other banks. 
 
8 In Oviedo’s model, there is not a relative deterioration of banks portfolios and capital structures 





with the description and analysis of the East Asian crisis by Corsetti et al. (1998).9 Their 
model is based on agency problems in domestic financial intermediation of international 
capital flows that originate in an informational advantage for domestic banks in domestic 
intermediation, and government provision of guarantees and insurance. Under this 
framework, banks intermediate lending to firms, which are subject to idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks, implying that firms will become insolvent with positive probability, 
in which event banks have the incentives to renegotiate the firm’s debt. Banks not only 
accumulate increasingly risky assets, but also become progressively more indebted 
through foreign borrowing; under implicit guarantees, this constitutes a contingent 
liability for the government. In this context, the crisis evolves endogenously as banks 
become increasingly fragile not only because of portfolio deterioration, but also because 
of the reduction of the total equity value of the banking sector, in absolute terms and in 
proportion to the equity value of the borrowing firms. 
 
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the liquidity crisis hypothesis considers the 
degree of bank’s illiquidity as the main source of bank failure. Panics, reflected in runs 
by domestic depositors and/or foreign lenders, first articulated by Diamond and Dybvig 
                                                 
9 Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) argue that the East Asian financial crisis was triggered by 
fundamental structural and policy distortions. The latter include not only weak macroeconomic 
policies, but also weak microeconomic policies, which increased the vulnerability of the banking 
sector through the deterioration of banks’ portfolios. In particular, the authors have emphasized 
that implicit guarantees led banks to engage in moral hazard lending (the “over-borrowing 





(1983), trigger the crisis, forcing even solvent but illiquid banks to fail because their 
liquidation value is lower than its implicit liabilities. Under this hypothesis, liquidity at 
the bank level is also a micro-level bank fundamental related to the risk of failure. In this 
sense, the liquidity crisis hypothesis involves not only aggregate measures of liquidity in 
the system, but also idiosyncratic measures of liquidity at the bank level. 
 
2.1.2 Review of the Empirical Literature 
After the East Asian crisis, most of the empirical studies trying to identify the nature and 
origins of systemic banking crisis in EMs have focused mainly on macroeconomic factors 
and institutional variables.10 At the micro-level, the majority of empirical studies on 
banking failures have focus mainly on the U.S. commercial banking industry. Among the 
                                                 
10 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 1999, and 
2000). Some of the explanatory variables used in these studies are the rate of growth of GDP per 
capita, the change in terms of trade, the rate of change of the exchange rate, the real interest rate, 
the rate of change of the GDP deflator, the ratio of central government budget surplus to GDP, 
the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, the ratio of domestic credit to the 
private sector to GDP, the ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets, the rate of change of the 
ratio of bank assets to GDP, a dummy variable for the presence of an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme, and an index of the quality of law enforcement. One exception is Honohan (1997) who 
performs a systematic evaluation of alternative indicators based on aggregate balance sheet 
indicators and indicators of macro-cycles: loan to deposit ratio, foreign borrowing to deposit 
ratio, growth rate of credit, share of reserves to deposits, level of lending to the government and 





recent contributions in the last decade, Thomson (1991), Whalen (1991), Cole and 
Gunther (1995, 1997), and Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) develop empirical analyses of 
the contribution of bank fundamentals, systemic and macroeconomic factors in different 
episodes of banking system problems in the U.S. [Southwest (1986-1992), Northeast 
(1991-1992), and California (1992-1993)]. The common methodology used by these 
authors has been the use of multivariate logit analysis and proportional hazard models, 
and their main findings are that measures of bank solvency and risk, proxied by CAMEL-
rating variables, explain the incidence of bank failures after controlling for aggregate 
factors. 11 Calomiris and Mason (2000) provide the first comprehensive econometric 
analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. The authors construct a 
model of survival duration and investigate the adequacy of bank fundamentals (measures 
of bank solvency and risk, related to the CAMEL-rating system) for the period 1930-
1933, after controlling for the effects of county, state, and national-level economic 
characteristics. They find that bank fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank 
failure and argue that “contagion” or “liquidity crises” were a relatively unimportant 
influence on bank failure risk prior to 1933.12 
                                                 
11 Earlier contributions are Sinkey (1975), Martin (1977), Barth et al. (1985), and Benston (1985). 
These studies seek to identify changes in bank-specific variables, related to the CAMEL-rating 
analysis, that lead to bank difficulties, and that therefore could be part of an early warning system 
of banking problems. 
 
12 Calomiris and Mason (1997) analyze the banking failures during the Chicago panic of June 




However, to date, there is little cross-country empirical evidence that evaluates the 
relative contribution of micro-level bank fundamentals in the context of the recent 
systemic banking crisis in EMs during the nineties. The main contributors to the literature 
of bank failures in EMs are Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999), Bongini, Claessens and Ferri 
(2000), and Rojas-Suarez (2001). 
 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) analyzes the contribution of bank-level fundamentals and 
macroeconomic factors for the Mexican banking crisis in 1994-95. The author finds that 
all ex-post measures of risk, and the loan-to assets ratio are associated with the 
probability and timing of failure. Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (2001) investigate the 
occurrence of bank distress (the financial institution was recapitalized by the government, 
received liquidity support, was merged or acquired by other institution, or was intervened 
or closed by the government) and closure decisions in five East Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) in order to assess the role of both 
bank’s “connections”--with industrial groups or influential families-- and banks’ micro-
weaknesses in causing and resolving bank failures. Among the main findings, CAMEL-
type variables, such as the ratios of loss loan reserves to capital and of net interest income 
to total income, help predict subsequent distress; and “connections” increase the 
probability of distress and make closure more likely.  Rojas-Suarez (2001) evaluates an 
alternative set of indicators based on “markets that work” rather than just relying on 
accounting figures (CAMEL-type variables) in order to identify in advance impending 
                                                                                                                                                 
during the panic reflected the relative weaknesses of failing banks in the face of a common asset 




banking problems. Using bank-level data for six EMs countries (Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) and applying the “signal to noise approach” 
methodology, which was used in the study of currency crises by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999). The author finds that the capital-to-asset ratio has performed poorly as an 
indicator of banking problems in Latin America and East Asia. On the other hand, 
interest rates on deposits and spreads have proven to be strong performers. 
 
While extremely informative, the first two of these studies have a number of limitations 
as far as the objectives of this paper are concerned. First, case studies are interesting in 
their own right. However, one major goal of this paper is to find common ground across 
different episodes of systemic banking crises, i.e., to find systematic underlying patterns 
that will allow us to make comparisons not only across countries, but also across regions 
(Latin America and East Asia) about the relative contribution of micro-level bank 
fundamentals in the recent episodes of systemic banking crisis. This information can be 
used by policymakers and financial regulators to develop a set of indicators of financial 
soundness in order to assess banking systems’ strengths and vulnerabilities.  
 
Second, Bongini et al. (2001)’s analysis of the probability of distress does not include 
non-crisis countries in East Asia, which could introduce a bias in the results in the sense 
that crisis countries had more bank failures just because they were affected by adverse 
aggregate shocks and not because of differences in ex-ante bank fundamentals (crisis 
countries had weaker banks ex-ante than non-crisis countries). Also, only a limited 




measures such as the capital-to-assets ratio, the loans-to-assets ratio, measures of 
liquidity, and market based indicators such as deposit interest rates, as mentioned by 
Rojas-Suarez (2001). This also could introduce a bias, because not all sources of risk 
(market, credit and liquidity) have been represented. The definition of distress includes 
institutions that were merged or acquired by other financial institutions. However, 
mergers and acquisitions could be due to strategic reasons rather than distress. In that 
sense, it is necessary to check the robustness of the results to the exclusion of this 
category of the definition of distress. A significant fraction of failures occurred in 1998 
and 1999. In this sense, one could use financial information for 1997 and 1998 in order to 
analyze the financial condition of failed institutions in 1998 and 1999, in addition to the 
information as of the end of 1996. In addition, one should include not only bank-level 
variables, but also systemic and macroeconomic variables to account for differences 
across countries and periods. The authors mention the last two points, arguing that the use 
of financial information as of the end 1996 introduces a bias against finding strong 
results. Third, neither study calculates the relative contribution of micro-level bank 
fundamentals to the probability of bank failure. 
 
2.2 Empirical Methodology 
In order to assess whether the waves of bank failure in the recent episodes of systemic 
banking crisis in EMs during the nineties reflected a fundamental deterioration in bank-
level conditions, first, I assess if bank-level heterogeneity is important for explaining 
cross-country bank failures, i.e., if crisis countries had weaker banks ex-ante than non-




results, I evaluate the relative contribution of bank-level fundamentals in the likelihood of 
failure, which allow us to determine if only the weakest banks, in terms of their 
fundamentals, failed in the crisis countries and if cross-sectional differences in bank-level 
fundamentals are sufficient or not to explain bank failures.  
 
In order to perform the first task, given a definition of bank failure, I perform a 
descriptive analysis to examine in a univariate context whether failed financial 
institutions were similar ex-ante to non-failed financial institutions. Mean tests of bank-
level fundamentals are performed, including market-based indicators such as the rate of 
decline in bank’s deposits, the implicit interest rate paid on deposits and loans, and 
interest rate spreads prior to the onset of systemic crisis. Then, I estimate the probability 
of bank failure using a cross-sectional multivariate logit model for East Asia and Latin 
America separately, including crisis and non-crisis countries. Finally, to evaluate the 
robustness of the cross-sectional logit results, I relax the assumption that the information 
used in the logit estimation accurately reflects unchanging cross-sectional differences in 
bank condition during the crisis periods by estimating a survival duration model 
separately for East Asia and Latin America for a window of time, using the same set of 
bank-level fundamentals, and also aggregate banking and macroeconomic variables, i.e., 
I include the time dimension in the estimation.  
 
Regarding the second task, I compute propensity scores, based on the cross-sectional 
logit results for individual financial institutions, using only bank-level fundamentals for 




to the likelihood of failure. In addition, a distributional analysis of these scores will allow 
us to evaluate the degree of overlapping between the distribution for failed and non-failed 
banks in the crisis countries to assess if only the weakest banks failed in the crisis 
countries. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Failure 
Most empirical studies of banking failures consider a financial institution to have failed if 
it either has received external support or was directly closed. Failure will be identified as 
one of the following categories (Bongini, et al., op.cit; and Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999):  
 
1. The financial institution was recapitalized by either the Central Bank or an agency 
specifically created to tackle the crisis; and/or required a liquidity injection from 
the Monetary Authority, 
2. The financial institution’s operations were temporally suspended (“frozen”) by 
the Government, 
3. The Government closed the financial institution, 
4. The financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution.  
 
Under this definition, these categories involve a broader concept of economic failure than 
the more restrictive concept of de jure failure (closure). One potential limitation is that 
category (4) could include financial institutions that were merged or absorbed for 




reason, in our statistical tests we will perform a sensitivity analysis excluding this 
category.13 
 
In the empirical implementation, a financial institution is considered as failed if it falls in 
any of the above categories between 1997 and 1999 in the case of East Asia, between 
December 1994 and December 1996 in the case of Argentina and Mexico, and between 
January 1994 and December 1995 in the case of Venezuela.14 Thirty one percent of the 
sample failed in East Asia and Latin America respectively. 
 
                                                 
13 This classification was done by looking at Central Banks’ annual reports and daily review of 
newspapers, in particular the Asian Wall Street Journal from March 1997 to August 1999. In 
addition, I cross my information with two alternative databases assembled by Bongini et al. 
(2001) and Laeven (1999). 
 
14 The crisis period is defined since the onset of the crisis (time T): January 1997 (East Asia), 
January 1994 (Venezuela), and December 1994 (Argentina and Mexico) up to two more years 





2.2.2 Stylized facts: Characteristics of Failed and Non-Failed Financial Institutions 
First, I examine whether failed institutions were similar ex-ante to non-failed 
institutions.15 In this context, mean tests of financial ratios are implemented separately 
prior to the onset of the crisis for both regions. Both CAMEL-type variables, which 
reflect the market, credit, operational and liquidity risk faced by the financial institutions, 
and market-based indicators (deposit interest rates and spreads) are analyzed. This 
analysis only reveals if there were statistical differences between failed and non-failed 
financial institutions; it does not isolate the contribution of particular variables to the 
probability or time of failure. 
 
2.2.3 Probability of Failure: Cross-Sectional Logit estimation 
Next, I estimate a cross-sectional multivariate logit model using CAMEL-type variables 
(that proxy for bank-level fundamentals), market-based indicators, and country dummies. 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution is identified in any 
of the categories of failure during the periods specified in section 2.2.1. I use as 
explanatory variables CAMEL-type variables associated with asset quality (the loan loss 
provisions to total loans ratio and the total loans to assets ratio), solvency (the total equity 
to total assets or liabilities ratio), liquidity (the liquid assets to total liabilities ratio), and 
profitability (return on assets). Also, I include the deposit interest rate and spread 
                                                 
15 Given the definition of failure, we classify the financial institutions into failed and non-failed 
and conduct the mean and median test over the different financial ratios in the two years prior to 





between the loan and deposit interest rate, and the logarithm of total assets to proxy for 
the size of the financial institution. See Appendix I, section A, for a detail presentation of 
the logit model. CAMEL-type variables and market-based indicators, are measured as of 
the end of 1996 for East Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), as of the end of 1993 for Venezuela, as of September 
1994 for Argentina and Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia and 
Peru.16 
 
2.2.4 Conditional Probability of Failure: Survival Duration Analysis 
Under the logit approach discussed above, I estimate the unconditional probability of 
failure, under the assumption that bank-level fundamentals (as of the end of 1993, 
September 1994, December 1994, and December 1996) accurately reflect unchanging 
cross-sectional differences in bank conditions throughout the period January 1997-
December 1999 for East Asia, January 1994-December 1995 for Venezuela, December 
1994-December 1996 for Argentina and Mexico. This assumption is not correct, because 
the crisis periods in East Asia and Latin America witnessed a continuous deterioration in 
asset values, implying that the failure threshold for banks was shifting over that period, 
                                                 
16 Non-crisis countries in East Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) and Latin America 
(Chile, Colombia, and Peru) are included in the estimation to examine the degree of overlap in 
bank-level fundamentals between crisis and non-crisis countries. In the case of Latin America, I 
performed a robustness check by including only Chile as a non-crisis country, given that 
Colombia and Peru were implementing structural reforms at that period of time. No significant 




Declining fundamentals can explain the quality difference between early and late bank 
failures during the crisis periods (Calomiris and Mason, 1997). 
 
To evaluate the robustness of the cross-sectional logit results, I estimate a survival 
duration model separately for both regions during the periods 1996-1999 for East Asia 
and 1993-1996 for Latin America, using the same set of CAMEL-type variables that 
proxy for bank level fundamentals, and also I include banking system and 
macroeconomic variables, which also could explain early and late bank failures during 
the crisis periods according to one stream of the literature on banking crisis reviewed 
before.17 The survival duration model allows for changes in the underlying transition 
probabilities during the crisis period. 
 
                                                 
17 Given that I have an exact record of the specific dates of each bank failure, I model each 
financial institution’s monthly failure as a function of bank-level fundamentals, banking system 
and macroeconomic variables, which are measured annually. I use the same set of CAMEL-type 
variables, market-based indicators, and size of the financial institutions as in the cross-sectional 
logit estimation. In addition, I include banking system variables, liquidity outside the financial 
institution and net foreign liabilities; and macroeconomic variables, the real exchange rate 
volatility, GDP growth, and a measure of the stock market. Banking system and macroeconomic 
variables are defined in the next section. See Appendix I, section B, for a detailed presentation of 





2.2.5 Calculation of Propensity Scores: Measure of the Relative Contribution of Bank-
Level Fundamentals 
Finally, based on the cross-sectional logit results for individual financial institutions, I 
compute propensity scores, using only bank-level fundamentals related to asset quality, 
solvency, liquidity and profitability for failed and non-failed financial institutions to 
determine their relative contribution to the likelihood of failure. In addition, a 
distributional analysis of these scores will allow us to evaluate the degree of overlap 
between the distribution for failed and non-failed banks in the crisis countries to assess if 
only the weakest banks failed in the crisis countries. 
 
2.3 Data Sources 
In the case of East Asia,18 financial statements for a sample of 444 financial institutions 
have been gathered from BankScope, a comprehensive database of balance sheet and 
income statement data for individual financial institutions across the world. This 
information covers the period 1995-1999 on annual basis. BankScope collects annual 
reports and financial statements from individual financial institutions, which are prepared 
according to the various national accounting standards, and adjusts the reported data to 
make them comparable across countries as much as possible.  
 
                                                 
18 Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand represent the crisis countries, and Hong 





The breakdown of data by countries is as follows: (i) 86 commercial banks and 3 other 
financial institutions in Indonesia; 19 (ii) 27 commercial banks and 28 other financial 
institutions in Korea; (iii) 41 commercial banks and 33 other financial institutions in 
Malaysia; (iv) 31 commercial banks and 5 other financial institutions in Philippines; (v) 
15 commercial banks and 26 other financial institutions in Thailand; (vi) 43 commercial 
banks and 96 other financial institutions in Hong Kong; (vii) 18 commercial banks and 39 
other financial institutions in Singapore; (viii) 36 commercial banks and 10 other 
financial institutions in Taiwan. 
 
Coverage of the national financial sector in terms of total assets is high for all five 
countries and substantial in terms of the number of commercial banks for Malaysia and 
Thailand. In terms of total assets, the coverage of the total commercial banking system in 
our sample varies between 80% and 100%. The coverage of other financial institutions is 
between 47% and 90%. The coverage in terms of number of commercial banks (local and 
foreign) is 35% in Indonesia, 34% in Korea, 100% in Malaysia, 63% in Philippines, and 
100% in Thailand. In the case of other financial institutions, the coverage is 3% in 
Indonesia, 49% in Korea, 55% in Malaysia, 5% in Philippines and 27% in Thailand. 
 
In the case of Latin America, I assemble a novel database by gathering annual balance 
sheets and income statements for a sample of 307 banks from official publications of the 
                                                 
19 Other financial institutions include finance companies in the case of Thailand; saving and 
investment banks, and merchant banks in the case of Korea and Malaysia; saving banks in the 




national financial supervisor offices of each crisis country (Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela), and for non-crisis countries (Chile, Colombia, and Peru) for the period 1992-
1996.20 The coverage of the financial information in terms of total assets is over 80 
percent for all the countries due to the fact the banking sector covers a very high share of 
the financial system in Latin American countries. As of the end of 1994, the coverage in 
terms of total assets is 98 percent in Argentina, over 80 percent in Mexico, and 84 percent 
in Venezuela. The breakdown of data by countries is as follows: (i) 171 commercial 
banks in Argentina; (ii) 27 commercial banks in Chile; (iii) 21 commercial banks in 
Colombia; (iv) 20 commercial banks in Mexico; 21 (v) 21 commercial banks in Peru; and 
(vi) 47 commercial banks in Venezuela.22 
                                                 
20 BankScope does not report financial information of banks that failed in Argentina, Mexico and 
Venezuela during their respective crisis periods. For this reason, I gathered the information 
separately for each crisis country. In this context, the coverage in terms of commercial banks is 
basically 100 percent. 
 
21 As of end 1994, there were 32 banks in Mexico. However, 12 banks report information since 
1994. For this reason, I only take banks that have al least one year of information previous to 
September 1994. 
 
22 See Appendix II for a complete description of the data sample, and Appendix III for the 





2.4.1 Bank-Level Fundamentals 
The theoretical models that stress the role of bank level fundamentals at the root of 
banking failures (Kletzer and Chinn and Deckle and Kletzer) establish that as a 
consequence of a bad management, the probability of failure is an increasing function of 
bank asset risk and solvency (leverage). Chang and Velasco (1999, 2001) stress the role 
of bank liquidity. I thus need bank-level variables that proxy for bank asset risk, liquidity, 
and solvency. 
 
According to Sinkey (1975), bank financial ratios reflect the variation in bank asset risk 
and leverage because they capture the market, credit, operational and liquidity risk faced 
by financial institutions. In this sense, bank balance sheets and income statements convey 
information about the ex-post consequences of management’s decisions, i.e., they provide 
an indirect measure of the managerial performance.  
 
The financial ratios used extensively in the empirical literature for the U.S. commercial 
banking industry are those related to the CAMEL-rating system. Regarding asset risk, 
ratios of loan loss reserves and loan loss provisions over both total loans and capital are 
ex-post measures of asset quality, and the ratio of total loans to total assets represents an 
ex-ante measure of asset risk.23 All of these ratios are expected to be positively related to 
                                                 
23 The ratio of non-performing loans over total loans is another traditional measure of asset 
quality, but it is not used here because it cannot be found consistently for all the selected 




the risk of bank failure. Bank profitability is also considered an ex-ante measure of asset 
risk (FDIC, 1997). Sustained levels of profitability allow the financial institution to 
increase its capital base and improve its viability, so profitability is negatively related to 
the risk of bank failure.24 
 
Solvency is related to the ability to withstand shocks, i.e., how well a financial institution 
can absorb losses. However, an operative concept of solvency (positive net worth) is 
difficult to measure in practice because of the presence of non-marketable assets or the 
absence of liquid markets for some categories of bank assets that make it difficult to 
obtain a consistent measure of bank’s asset value. In this context, solvency has been 
proxied by the extent of leverage, where the ratio of total capital (total equity plus loss 
loan reserves) over total assets is the traditional measure of solvency used in the 
empirical literature. 25  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
standards.  On the other hand, ratios of bank’s portfolio concentration, which are related to ex-
ante bank asset risk, are not included due to data availability constraints. 
 
24 However, exceptionally risky projects could be associated with huge rates of return so it is 
possible that for some threshold a high degree of profitability could be associated positively with 
the risk of failure (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1997). 
 
25 In particular, the risk-adjusted capital asset ratio has been the traditional proxy for solvency. In 
1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision established a minimum standard of 8 percent 




I introduce two additional measures of bank solvency: the ratio of total capital over total 
liabilities and over total liabilities plus off-balance sheet items. The measure of the extent 
of leverage using liabilities instead of assets provides a more sensible measure of the 
bank buffer stock that will serve as a cushion to absorb losses, particularly since the latest 
episodes of banking crisis witnessed not only shocks to bank assets, but also to the 
deposit base. In addition, the explicit inclusion of off-balance sheet positions produces a 
more accurate measure of bank leverage and exposure (Breuer, 2000). Moreover, this 
measure accounts for the fact that “the rapid unwinding of positions, as all counter parties 
run for liquidity, is characterized by creditors demanding payment, selling collateral, and 
putting on hedges, while debtors draw down capital and liquidate other assets. This can 
result in extreme market volatility” (IMF, 2002). 
 
Regarding liquidity risk, the traditional indicator of bank liquidity has been the ratio of 
liquid assets (cash and reserves, government bonds, and other marketable securities) over 
total assets as a measure of the maturity structure of the asset portfolio, which can reflect 
excessive maturity mismatches. On the other hand, given that liquid assets allow financial 
institutions to meet unexpected deposit withdrawals, the liquidity of assets relative to 
liabilities is also a factor affecting the risk of bank failure (Calomiris and Mason, 2000). 
For this reason, both ratios, which are negatively related to the risk of bank failure, are 
included in the empirical analysis. 
 
In addition, following Rojas-Suarez (2001), I include two additional measures of the 




figures. I analyze the effect of interest rates (for loans and deposits) and spreads26 on the 
probability of bank failure, because such prices are a direct measure of bank default risk 
(Calomiris and Mason, op. cit.). An aggressive bidding for deposits could be associated 
with a higher likelihood of bank failure, because depositors demand high rates from 
banks they perceive as risky, i.e., depositors could have information about bank 
vulnerability not captured by CAMEL-type variables, that cause equilibrium deposit rates 
to be higher for institutions perceive as risky by depositors.  
 
Even though bank size, measured by total assets, is not considered by the existing 
theoretical literature as a bank level fundamental, it is included in the analysis to account 
for the fact that larger banks are better able to diversify their loan portfolio, reducing their 
asset risk (Calomiris and Mason, op. cit.), and also because “too big to fail” policies 
could extend the survival time (reduce the probability of failure) of larger banks. 
 
The use of financial ratios as proxies of fundamental bank attributes provides information 
about the symptoms rather than the causes of financial difficulty, in the sense that they 
provide leading indicators of incipient crisis (Johnston, et al., 1998). In this sense, I focus 
on the near-term fragility (vulnerability) of the financial institutions and not on medium-
to-longer-term vulnerabilities, which requires the identification and evaluation of 
potential structural weaknesses that can affect incentives to screen and monitor risks. At 
                                                 
26 The spread equals the difference between the loan interest rate and the implicit deposit interest 
rate. The loan interest ate is calculated as the ratio between interest income and total loans. The 




the operational level, this involves a review of the institutional structure, the legal and 
regulatory system, corporate governance, the nature of implicit and explicit guarantees, 
and the effect of financial reform or liberalization (Johnston, et al. 2000). 
 
2.4.2 Banking System Variables 
Banking variables capture potential contagion effects that the banking system (banks and 
other financial institutions) as a whole could transmit to individual financial institutions 
at the domestic and international level. On the one hand, there is domestic liquidity risk, 
where depositor runs from some banks reduce the pool of liquidity over total deposits in 
the system and spread negative externalities (spillovers) on other banks under asymmetric 
information on the part of the depositors regarding the solvency of the financial 
institutions (Diamond and Rajan, 2002). 27 On the other hand, there is international 
liquidity risk, where a higher ratio of the financial system’s foreign liabilities over 
                                                 
27 Diamond and Rajan (2002) argue that contagion effects could be caused not only by contractual 
or asymmetric information links, but also because bank failures could lead to a contraction in the 
common pool of liquidity, and this negative spillover effect raises the likelihood of failure of 
other banks. In this context, domestic liquidity risk is proxied by the total amount of liquidity 
relative to total deposits outside the bank, i.e., the amount of cash in vaults in the rest of banks in 
the system (the summation over the n-1 banks) over the total amount of deposits in the rest of 






international reserves increases its vulnerability to exogenous shocks and shifts in 
expectations of international investors (Chang and Velasco, 2001). 28 
 
2.4.3 Macroeconomic Variables 
Unexpected macroeconomic shocks undermine the viability of financial institutions 
(Hausmann and Gavin, op. cit. and Oviedo, op. cit.). The macroeconomic variables 
included in the empirical implementation not only capture the effect of real exchange rate 
volatility29, but also the effects of economic activity and stock markets. With respect to 
economic activity, I use the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Regarding stock markets, a decline in the total value of bank equities relative to the 
overall market value suggests that the aggregate portfolio of the banking system is 
deteriorating and becoming increasingly vulnerable in a context of foreign capital 
inflows, imperfect prudential regulation, implicit guarantees, and renegotiation of firm 
                                                 
28 International liquidity risk is proxied by the ratio of Bank and Other Financial Institutions’ Net 
Foreign Liabilities to Net International Reserves. The data is obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS). Lines 21, 26c, 41, 41c, and 11c. 
 
29 Real exchange rate volatility is calculated as the monthly average of the standard deviation of 





debts (Dekle and Kletzer, op. cit.). In this context, a decline in this ratio would be 
associated with an increase in the probability of failure (higher financial fragility).30 
 
2.5 Empirical Evidence 
2.5.1 Characteristics of Failed and Non-Failed Financial Institutions  
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report mean tests for differences in the bank-level fundamentals 
between failed and non-failed financial institutions over two years prior to the onset of 
the crisis for East Asia (EA) and Latin America (LA) respectively. In the case of EA, 
Table 1 presents the results for the whole sample of financial institutions (FIs) and for 
commercial banks only; results are similar for both samples. This table suggests that 
failed FIs showed early signs of vulnerability before the onset of the crisis. 
 
Regarding asset risk, failed FIs showed a higher ratio of loss loan reserves and provisions 
to total equity, and a higher ratio of loans to total assets, than non-failed FIs, i.e., it is not 
only high lending but bad lending that characterizes failed institutions. With respect to 
solvency, failed FIs showed a lower ratio of capital to total assets and total liabilities (also 
including off-balance sheet items), i.e., higher leverage makes FIs less able to absorb 
negative shocks. 
                                                 
30 This ratio is calculated using the stock market index of the banking sector and the general stock 





Regarding liquidity, failed FIs showed not only a lower ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets but also to total liabilities, which made these institutions less able to withstand 
unexpected deposit withdrawals. In addition, failed FIs showed lower profitability (return 
on assets), which made these institutions less able to increase their capital base and 
improve their viability.  
 
With respect to market-based indicators, the results indicate that up to two years before 
the onset of the crisis, the implicit deposit interest rate (spread) was higher (lower) for 
failed FIs than for non-failed FIs, while there were not statistical differences in the 
implicit loan interest rate. The growth rate of real deposits is insignificantly lower for 
failed than for non-failed institutions one year before the onset of the crisis. These facts 
suggest that failed banks were bidding aggressively to attract deposits, which could also 
be consistent with a higher degree of risk taking activities. Regarding spreads, Rojas-
Suarez (op. cit.) argues that narrow spreads should be interpreted differently in emerging 
markets than in industrial-country financial markets; in the latter, narrow spreads reflect 
efficiency, but in emerging markets they can indicate increased bank risk taking.  
 
In the case of LA, the results in Table 2.2 resemble those for EA regarding asset risk, 
solvency, and profitability. Failed banks showed lower liquidity ratios than non-failed 
banks only in the period immediately before the onset of the crisis. With respect to 
market-based indicators, the results show that in the pre-crisis period the implicit deposit 




statistical differences in the growth rate of deposits.31 This suggests that failed banks had 
to offer higher returns in order to obtain financing for high risk taking activities before 
the onset of the crisis. In addition, the results show no statistical differences in spreads for 
the whole sample32, but a higher implicit interest rate on loans for failed banks than for 
non-failed banks in the period prior to the onset of the crisis, suggesting that failed banks 
made investments in riskier projects than non-failed banks. 
 
2.5.2 Probability of Failure: Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation 
Table 2.3 reports explanatory variables’ marginal effects in the cross-sectional 
multivariate logit model for East Asia. According to the results, higher capital relative to 
assets or liabilities (also including off-balance-sheet items) is negatively associated with 
the probability of failure. A higher level of liquid assets relative to total liabilities and a 
higher return on assets reduce the probability of failure. A higher ratio of loans to total 
assets has a positive impact on failure. However, the measures of asset quality, loan loss 
                                                 
31 In the case of Venezuela, the rate of deposit growth was lower than the implicit deposit interest 
before the onset of the crisis, which implies a transfer problem, i.e., banks were transferring net 
resources to the depositors reducing their profitability. 
 
32 In the period previous to the onset of the crisis, spreads in Mexico and Venezuela are lower for 
failed banks than for non-failed banks, which are consistent with the results of Rojas-Suarez 
(2001), and give support to the hypothesis that lower spreads reflect mainly risk taking activities 





reserves and loan loss provisions over total loans, are not significant.33 The latter suggests 
that lagging indicators of bank soundness are not good predictors of bank failures under 
lax standards for loan classification and loan loss provisioning. In the East Asian crisis 
countries, loans were classified as bad loans only if they had been in arrears for six 
months or more, and in addition, banks would frequently restructure such loans to reduce 
the size of reported portfolio problems (IMF, 1999). The marginal effect of the deposit 
interest rate is positive and significant, which implies that banks that bid aggressively for 
deposits increase their likelihood of failure. Finally, the logarithm of total assets has the 
right sign (negative), but is not significant. 
 
Table 2.4 reports results for LA, which resemble those obtained for EA; bank 
fundamentals have the correct sign and explain significantly the probability of failure. 
However, the ex-post measure of asset quality (loan loss provisions over total loans) is 
marginally significant. As in the case of EA, the marginal effect of the deposit interest 
rate is positive and significant. In addition, the size of the bank is negatively associated 
with the probability of failure, which would give support the “too big to fail” 
hypothesis.34 In this sense, failed financial institutions had particular characteristics in 
                                                 
33 In addition, an estimation using the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans was performed, and 
there were not qualitative differences. 
 
34 This result also could be related to the fact that larger banks are better able to diversify their 





both regions prior to the onset of their respective systemic banking crisis, and bank-level 
heterogeneity is important for explaining the variation in failure rates, i.e., banks that 
failed during the episodes of bank distress in EMs were observably weaker ex ante (more 
vulnerable to negative asset-value shocks) than to banks that survived the crisis.35  
 
Regarding spreads, in the case of EA, the marginal effect of the spread variable is 
negative and insignificant. Even though the sign is negative, this result does not support 
the hypothesis that lower spreads increase the probability of failure in EMs (Rojas-
Suarez, 2001). For LA, the marginal effect is positive and significant giving, support to 
the traditional hypothesis that high spreads increase banks’ fragility.36 As in the case of 
deposit interest rate, measures of liquidity, solvency and ex-ante risk (loans-to-assets 
ratio) are significant, while the loss loans reserves and loan loss provisions ratios are not 
significant. 
 
                                                 
35 An additional exercise was done for both regions including an ownership dummy (foreign or 
domestic). Foreign ownership was negatively associated with the probability of failure. 
 
36 However, this result could be driven by the inclusion of Argentina, because spreads of failed 
institutions in Mexico and Venezuela were lower than those of non-failed banks. Only in the case 
of Argentina, do we have the usual result obtained in developed economies that failed institutions 




2.5.3 Conditional Probability of Failure: Survival Duration Analysis 
Table 2.5 presents the results of the survival duration model for the period 1996-1999 for 
East Asia. After controlling for aggregate banking and macroeconomic variables, the 
coefficients of bank-level fundamentals are of predicted sign and significant. Higher 
lending relative to assets is positively associated with the timing of failure. Higher 
capitalization (relative to assets and liabilities) is negatively associated with the timing of 
failure. Higher profitability and higher liquid assets relative to total assets are negatively 
associated with the timing of failure. Larger banks are associated with longer survival, 
consistent with the “too big to fail” hypothesis. The ex-post measure of asset quality, the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, is marginally significant. 
 
Regarding the aggregate banking and macroeconomic variables, the measure of system 
liquidity, which captures potential contagion effects, is positively associated with survival 
time in all specifications, i.e., higher liquidity relative to deposits outside the bank gives 
positive spillovers, increasing the survival time of the bank. A higher volatility of the real 
effective exchange rate index is associated with a lower survival time. As expected, 
increases in the economic activity of the sectors in which financial institutions 
concentrate their loans are positively associated with the time of survival. The higher the 
value of bank stocks relative to the total stock market, the longer the time of survival.  
 
Table 2.6 presents the results for LA. As in the case of EA, after controlling for aggregate 
banking and macroeconomic variables, coefficients of bank-level fundamentals related to 




predicted sign and significantly explain the time of survival. Results for the banking 
system liquidity, the real exchange rate and economic activity are similar to those of EA. 
The ex-post measure of asset quality is not significant. Overall, the results show that 
measures of (ex-ante) bank asset risk, solvency, liquidity and profitability significantly 
affected the survival time of financial institutions in both regions after controlling for the 
presence of potential contagion effects in the banking system as a whole, and for shocks 
to the macroeconomic environment.37 
 
2.5.4 Calculation of Propensity Scores:  Measure of the Relative Contribution of Bank-
Level Fundamentals  
I calculate propensity scores for failed and non-failed FIs across crisis and non-crisis 
countries based on the individual cross-sectional estimated probabilities of failure, which 
allow us to estimate the relative contribution bank-level fundamentals to bank failure for 
each group of institutions.38 Table 2.7 shows three main results for EA. First, the average 
aggregate degree of vulnerability of non-failed institutions in crisis countries was higher 
                                                 
37 In addition, I performed the survival analysis including spreads. Spreads have a negative sign 
but they are not significant in the case of EA. For LA, spreads affect positively the time of failure.  
 
38 The bank-level fundamentals used in the calculations are those related to asset quality (loan 
loss provisions ratio, and the total loans to assets ratio), solvency (the ratio of total equity over 
total assets or liabilities), liquidity (liquid assets to total liabilities ratio), and profitability (return 





than that of non-failed institutions in non-crisis countries.39 This result suggests that the 
differences in the regulatory and supervisory environment in crisis countries could have 
given “incentives” to bank managers for high risk taking activities relative to non-crisis 
countries.40 Second, the average degree of vulnerability of failed institutions in crisis 
countries was higher than that of non-failed institutions in non-crisis countries; only 
bank-level fundamentals explain fifty percent of the probability of crisis.  This result 
implies that there were many fragile FIs with particular ex-ante characteristics that made 
them more vulnerable to failure ex-post. Third, in the crisis countries, there is little 
overlap in the distribution of aggregate scores between failed institutions and non-failed 
institutions. This result implies that mainly the weakest institutions failed in the crisis 
countries, suggesting that the social costs of the unwarranted closure of solvent 
institutions (if any) must have been small. 
 
                                                 
39 The average degree of vulnerability for non-failed FIs in crisis countries is even higher if 
Philippines is removed from the sample of crisis countries. Philippines was the country least 
affected by the crisis in East Asia. 
 
40In addition, mean tests were performed among non-failed FIs between crisis and non-crisis 
countries. Non-failed institutions in crisis countries showed lower capitalization, profitability, 
liquidity, and spreads; and a higher ratio of loans over total assets than non-distress financial 
institutions in non-crisis countries up to two years before the onset of the crisis. This result 
suggests that non-failed FIs in crisis countries had a higher degree of vulnerability than non-failed 





Table 2.7 also shows the distribution of the propensity scores for LA. As in the case of 
EA, the degree of vulnerability of failed institutions in crisis countries was higher than 
that of non-failed institutions in non-crisis countries; bank-level fundamentals explain 
forty-nine percent of the probability of crisis. However, the aggregate degree of 
vulnerability of non-failed institutions in crisis countries was similar to that of non-failed 
institutions in non-crisis countries,41 and there is an overlapping in the distribution of 
aggregate scores between failed institutions and non-failed institutions in the crisis 
countries. These results imply that aggregate factors affecting the banking system are 
relatively more important in Latin America than in East Asia, in such a way that a 
fraction of healthy institutions may be forced to fail in the context of unexpected 
aggregate shocks to the system.42 The latter is consistent with the finding of Kaminsky 
                                                 
41 In the case of LA, non-failed institutions in crisis countries showed similar ratios of 
capitalization, profitability, liquidity, but a higher ratio of loans over total assets than non-failed 
financial institutions in non-crisis countries prior to the onset of the crisis. This result suggests 
that non-failed banks in crisis countries had a similar degree of vulnerability to non-failed banks 
in non-crisis countries. 
 
42The previous results are based on a broad definition of failure that includes mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), which could be done for strategic reasons and need not imply a form of 
failure. For this reason, I perform a sensitivity analysis excluding from our broad definition of 
failure cases in which the financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial 
institution. The cross-sectional multivariate logit model for both regions showed in tables 3 and 4 
is distorted, in particular those results related to asset risk, where a higher ratio of loan loss 




and Reinhart (1998) that East Asia and Latin America have different regional patterns for 
banking crisis. Systemic banking crises in Latin America have been more volatile and 
severe than those in East Asia. 
 
According to these results, bank-level fundamentals are important, but they are not 
sufficient to explain cross-countries differences in crisis outcomes because there is some 
overlap in the propensity score distributions of financial institutions in non-crisis 
















                                                                                                                                                 
case, and the ratio of total loans to total assets is now not significant (see Appendix IV, Tables 
IV.2 and IV.3). In addition, I performed mean tests between Non-Failed Financial Institutions and 
Financial Institutions that were Mergered or Acquired (M&A), which show that there were 
statistical differences in measures of asset risk, solvency, liquidity, and profitability, suggesting 
that M&A banks had higher vulnerability than other non-failed banks (see Appendix IV, Table 
IV.1). All together, these results imply that being merged or acquired was part of a bail out policy 





Chapter 3: Bank Fundamentals and Market Discipline 
 
3.1 Stylized Facts and Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
3.1.1 Stylized Facts 
Emerging markets in East Asia and Latin America experienced significant episodes of 
sharp deposit contraction during the systemic banking crises that occurred in the nineties. 
As we can observe in Table 3.1 and Figure 1, sharp deposit contractions were preceded 
by bank asset-value shocks related to abrupt devaluations; sharp increases in interest 














                                                 
43 In the case of EA, the first vertical line in the graphs of stock market indexes represents the 
official onset of the crisis (the July 2nd devaluation of the bath in Thailand). Subsequent lines 
mark the onset of sharp deposit contractions in each country (note that some countries experience 
multiple contractions). For LA, the vertical line marks the beginning of the Mexican crisis 
(December 1994) and Venezuelan crisis (January 1994). The vertical lines in the graphs of 




Table 3.1 Total Deposit Contraction in Crisis Countries 
 
Author’s calculations based on Central Bank statistical reports, and International Financial Statistics. 
 
Among the crisis countries, Thailand and Korea showed a continuous decline in stock 
values in real estate, the banking sector and the general index one year prior to the onset 
of the crisis. On the one hand, the stock market decline presumably reduced the quality 
and liquidity of banks’ assets and capital base, increasing their vulnerability to aggregate 
shocks. On the other hand, the equity decline may also have reduced depositors’ 
confidence about whether banks would be able to handle the negative impact of the 
equity decline, in a context of asymmetric information about bank conditions. In addition, 
both countries faced a decline in economic activity prior to the onset of the crisis, putting 
more pressure on banks’ asset quality and liquidity due to borrowers’ difficulty repaying 
loans. In Indonesia and Malaysia, stock values were driven down by the sharp asset price 
declines and devaluations coming from Thailand and Korea, showing a continuous 
decline in equity values affecting not only banks’ asset value and capital base, but also 
Country Exchange Rate Devaluation (%) Contraction in the Total Deposit Base
Thailand Jul. 97:  17.6 Aug. 97 (3.7%)
Jan. 98: 18.8 Feb.98 - Apr. 98 (4.4%)
Indonesia Aug. 97 - Oct. 97: 43.6 Nov. 97 (3.7%)
May 98 - Jun. 98: 70.3 Jul. 98 - Aug. 98 (1.8%) 
Korea Dec. 97: 44.7 Jan. 98 (3%)
Jan. 98 : 14.7 (6.5 % in local currency) 
Malaysia Dec. 97 - Jan. 98: 29.0 Jan. 98 - May 98 (3.3%) 
May 98 - Aug. 98: 12.6 Oct. 98 - Nov. 98 (1.8%) 
Philippines Dec. 97 - Jan. 98: 22.5 Feb.98 - May. 98 (7.4%) 
Feb. 98 (5.0%)
Mexico Dec. 94: 14.2 Jan. 95 - Feb. 95 (4.9%)
Jan. 95 : 40.3 
Mar. 95 : 17.9 Apr. 95 - Jul. 95 (1.1%)
Argentina Dec. 94 - Feb. 95 (7%)
Mar. 95 (9.9%)
Apr. 95 - mid May 95 (2.5%) 
Venezuela Jan. 92 - Dec. 93 (27.9%) 
Jun. 93- Dec. 93 (20.3%) 
May 94: 17.3 Apr. 94 - Jun 94 (11.5%) 




depositors’ confidence. In this context, deposit runs in Indonesia and Malaysia also 
occurred in an environment characterized by sharp declines in asset prices.  
 
In the case of LA, Venezuela showed both a continuous decline in its stock market index 
and an increase in real interest rates prior to the onset of the crisis (January 1994). In 
addition, there was a decline in the rate of growth of GDP two years prior to the onset of 
its crisis. All together, these facts affected directly not only the banking system, 
increasing its vulnerability to unexpected aggregate shocks, but also the confidence of 
depositors, who began to withdraw their deposits in 1992. Mexico showed a decline in its 
stock market in early 1994 due to political instability and an increase in real interest rates 
of Government instruments (Cetes and Tesobonos), which were held by banks in 
important amounts.44 However, Argentina did not show signs of equity declines or an 
increase in interest rates before December 1994. In this sense, the beginning of the crisis 
was driven mainly by a contagion effect from the Mexican crisis, due to the risk of 







                                                 
44 As of December 1994, 50 percent of the commercial banking financial portfolio investment 




Figure 2.1 Stock Markets and Total Deposits in Crisis Countries 
STOCK MARKET INDEXES: THAILAND
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REAL STATE TOTAL MARKET BANK
THAILAND : TOTAL DEPOSITS (DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS) 




































































KOREA DMB: TOTAL DEPOSITS (DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS)


















































INDONESIA: TOTAL DEPOSITS 








































































MALAYSIA DMB: TOTAL DEPOSITS (DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS)
























































Figure 2.2 Stock Markets and Total Deposits in Crisis Countries (concluded) 
 
STOCK MARKET INDEX : ARGENTINA













































































STOCK MARKET INDEX : MEXICO















































































STOCK MARKET INDEX : PHILIPPINES
























































BANK REAL STATE GENERAL
PHILIPPINES : TOTAL DEPOSITS














































































MEXICO COMMERCIAL BANKS: TOTAL DEPOSITS

















































































VENEZUELA COMMERCIAL BANKS: TOTAL DEPOSITS
































































































































































VENEZUELA: STOCK MARKET INDEX













































































Although there was an abrupt decline in the total deposit base in the crisis countries, 
which could imply a generalized panic by depositors, the deposit contraction was not the 
same for failed and non-failed banks during the peak of the crisis periods. Table 3.2 
reports mean tests of the deposit growth rate during the peak of the crisis periods for 






Table 3.2 Mean Tests of Deposit Growth Rates in Crisis Countries 
COUNTRY PERIOD NON-FAILED FAILED 
EA crisis countries 1997-1998 -15.6 -28.2*** 
Indonesia 1997-1998 -17.5 -36.6*** 
Korea 1997-1998 -4.7 -18.9* 
Malaysia 1998 -11.6 -12.4 
Thailand 1997-1998 -2.5 -32.4** 
    
Argentina 1995 (as of June) -15.3 -28.7*** 
Mexico  1995 (as of June) -7.9 -16.7** 
Venezuela 1994 26.3 -8.1*** 
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 
percent respectively. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
 
Failed banks had a higher rate of deposit decline during the peak of the crisis periods than 
non-failed banks, with the exception of Malaysia.45 This asymmetry in depositors’ 
response to bank asset-value shocks would give preliminary support to the proposition 
that depositors sorted among banks during the periods of sudden deposit withdrawals, 
i.e., depositors reassessed bank specific risks in such a way that ex ante weaker banks 
were considered less prepared to absorb shocks affecting assets value.  
 
                                                 
45 During the pre-crisis period there were not statistical differences in the growth rate of deposits 
between failed and non-failed banks in Latin America and East Asia. However, there were 
statistical differences in the deposit interest rate between failed and non-failed banks in both 
regions. Failed banks paid higher interest rates to compensate depositors for the higher risk 
undertaken. This result is still consistent with the market discipline hypothesis: “Rationing is a 
possible but not a necessary result for market discipline. If deposit allocations before the crisis do 
not reflect differences between both types of banks it should be the case that the interest rates 




In addition, even though Singapore, Taiwan, Colombia, Chile and Peru experienced a 
decline in stock values, there were not episodes of sharp deposit contractions in these 
countries (see Figure 2). The latter provides us with additional significant information 
regarding bank-level heterogeneity to explain cross-country differences in the behavior of 
the growth rate of deposits and deposit interest rates.  
Figure 2.3 Stock Markets and Total Deposits in Non-Crisis Countries 
STOCK MARKET INDEXES: SINGAPORE









































































BANK REAL STATE GENERAL
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STOCK MARKET INDEX: PERU




























































































































STOCK MARKET INDEX: CHILE



























































































































3.1.2 Market Discipline Hypothesis 
Regarding deposit withdrawals, Saunders and Wilson (1994) distinguish among three 
situations: “pure” contagion, a mixture of contagion with informed depositors, and a non-
contagious run. In the case of “pure” contagion, depositors are uninformed and unable to 
sort between solvent and insolvent banks, so deposit withdrawals occur against both 
types of banks.46 In the case of non-contagious withdrawals, depositors reallocate their 
deposits from weak banks to healthy banks. Finally, in the case of a mixture, informed 
deposits, informed depositors at failing banks withdraw before failure, so the rate of 
withdrawals at failing banks are higher than that at non-failing banks.  
 
The last two cases are consistent with the market discipline hypothesis (information 
based approach) as developed by Berger (1991), who defines market discipline as a 
situation in which economic agents face costs that increase with bank risk and take 
actions on the basis of these costs. In a principal-agent problem, the principal (depositor), 
by reacting to risk, disciplines the agent (bank manager), reducing in this way ex-ante 
excessive risk taking in the banking system, e.g., depositors withdraw their deposits or 
require higher interest rates when banks take more risk. [See Jacklin and Battacharya 
                                                 
46This view is related to the liquidity shock approach, as developed in Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), Waldo (1985) and Donaldson (1992), where deposit withdrawals are made without any 
consideration of banks’ asset quality and solvency. In this hypothesis, the focus is on bank’s 
illiquidity. i.e., solvent but illiquid banks may be forced to fail. However, this approach could be 
extended by including heterogeneity in the degree of bank illiquidity in such a way that even a 
liquidity shock model would predict that ex-ante weaker banks would be most likely to fail in the 




(1988), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Calomiris et al. (1991), Calomiris and Gorton 
(1991), and Jacklin (1993)]. 
 
As long as there exits heterogeneity across banks in terms of asset quality, liquidity, and 
capital structure, depositors could attempt to sort among ex-ante healthy and weak banks 
in the context of asymmetric information regarding the effect of aggregate shocks to both 
the quality and liquidity of banks’ assets and capital structure. In this sense, deposit runs 
could reflect an episode of market discipline, i.e., depositors respond to measures of bank 
risk (asset quality, liquidity, and solvency) by withdrawing their deposits and/or by 
requiring riskier banks to pay higher interest rates. 
 
3.1.3 Review of the Empirical Literature 
The majority of empirical studies on depositors’ discipline focus on the U.S. commercial 
banking industry, even though the recent experiences of systemic banking crises have 
occurred in emerging markets. Flannery (1998) provides a detailed survey of this 
literature. Most of these studies examine market discipline by analyzing either how yields 
on uninsured deposits (Baer and Brewer (1986), Hannan and Hanweck (1988), Ellis and 
Flannery (1992)) or the level or growth of uninsured deposits (Goldberg and Hudgins 
(1996)) respond to measures of bank risk and solvency, as captured by balance sheets, 
income statements and market measures of risk.47 The studies of Park (1995) and Park 
                                                 
47 Measures of risk and solvency are related to the CAMEL-rating variables: non-performing 
loans as a ratio of total loans, loan loss provisions, the capital to assets ratio, the ratio of real 




and Peristiani (1998) analyze market discipline taking into account both yields and 
growth of uninsured deposits. The results of these studies support the information-based 
approach to bank runs, showing that riskier banks pay higher interest rates, but at the 
same time attract fewer uninsured deposits.48  
 
However, the empirical evidence on depositors’ discipline is not very extensive for EMs. 
The main contributors to the literature of depositors’ discipline for EM’s are Schumacher 
(1996), D’Amato, Grubisic, and Powell (1997), Barajas and Steiner (1999), and 
Schmuckler and Martinez-Peria (2001). 
 
Schumacher (1996) examines the 1994-95 Argentine banking panic. Using a bank-level 
dataset, the author tests if cross-sectional differences in deposit withdrawals are explained 
by measures of bank risk and solvency. As a first step, the author estimates the 
probability of bank failures through a multivariate logit approach using accounting 
information as of November 1994, finding that the actual capital to required capital ratio, 
return on equity, and proxies for liquidity (interbank loans, dollar deposits over total 
deposits, and term deposits over total deposits) explain the probability of failure. Then, as 
a second step, the author finds that the estimated probability of failure is negatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
48 Cook and Spellman (1994) provide evidence that riskier banks pay higher interest rates even on 
insured deposits. In addition, studies of market discipline related to the period of the Great 
Depression, (Park (1991), Saunders and Wilson (1996), Calomiris and Mason (1997), and 





related to the growth rate of deposits, in particular during the peak of the crisis in March 
1995. In addition, the author finds that implicit interest rates paid by failing banks 
(merged and closed institutions) were higher than those paid by surviving banks. 
 
D’Amato, Grubisic, and Powell (1997) also examine the 1994-95 Argentine banking 
panic. The focus of their paper is to use daily deposit data to distinguish the effect of 
bank fundamentals from the importance of contagion and generalized macroeconomic 
shocks that affect banks simultaneously. Using daily deposit data for a sample of 120 
banks, over a four-month period around the panic, the authors estimate a random effects 
model of daily changes in deposits as a function of bank fundamentals (as of November 
1994) and macroeconomic variables (which vary across time but not across banks). Then, 
using a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test the authors indicate that there remain 
significant random time effects. As a second step, the authors include lagged deposits of 
other banks as a proxy for contagion effects and test again for residual co-movement. 
They cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no random time effect, interpreting this 
result as evidence of contagion in depositor behavior during the panic. 
 
Barajas and Steiner (2000) study if depositors discipline bank behavior for the period 
1986-1999 in Colombia. Using panel-data estimation with semi-annual data, the authors 
find that the growth rate of real deposits reacts to bank fundamentals (loss loan 
provisions, capital-to- asset ratio, and liquidity), and also to the interest rate paid on 
deposits as a measure of return. In addition, the authors analyze the response of banks to 




in deposits, finding that only loss loan provisions behave in a manner consistent with 
market discipline.  
 
Schmuckler and Martinez-Peria (2001) evaluate empirically both the interaction between 
market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market 
discipline, focusing on the individual experiences of Argentina, Chile and Mexico during 
the eighties and nineties. Assembling a bank-level dataset that distinguishes between 
insured and uninsured deposits, and using panel data techniques, the authors find that 
depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and requiring higher interest rates. In 
addition, the authors find that deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of 
market discipline and that the depositors’ responsiveness to bank risk is lower during 
periods of banking crisis compared to non-panic times. 
 
Most of these empirical studies, with the exception of Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, are 
case studies focusing in particular on the Argentine experience. In this sense, while 
extremely informative, these studies have a limitation as far as the objectives of this 
paper. They do not provide evidence of common underlying patterns in depositors’ 
discipline across not only countries but also regions, which would give policymakers and 
financial regulators more insights regarding the type of information about bank portfolios 
and capital structures that should be available to depositors, and for whether regulators 
should rely on private market discipline as one of the main components of the regulatory 
framework. I will fill this gap by extending the existing empirical evidence not only to 




which have not been studied yet. Also, I include in the sample countries that experience 
asset-value shocks, but did not have sudden deposit withdrawals (non-crisis countries) in 
order to assess the role of bank-level heterogeneity across country experiences. In this 
context, I study to what extent deposit withdrawals constituted an act of market discipline 
in the recent episodes of banking problems in Latin America and East Asia. 
 
3.2 Empirical Methodology 
In order to assess if depositors react to bank level fundamentals in such a way that deposit 
withdrawals could be considered an action of market discipline in the crisis countries, I 
test if riskier banks attract fewer deposits. The null hypothesis is that deposit withdrawals 
and deposit interest rates did not respond to observable weaknesses in individual financial 
institutions, traceable to ex-ante bank characteristics, i.e., that deposit runs in the crisis 
countries were episodes of pure contagion (random withdrawals hypothesis). If bank 
level fundamentals explain significantly the growth rate of real deposits in the crisis 
countries, I interpret this as evidence in favor of the market discipline hypothesis, and 
reject the pure contagion hypothesis, which argues that deposit withdrawals are not 
related to bank level fundamentals. In order to implement the test, I estimate the 
following reduced form equation for the growth rate of real deposits in local constant 
currency terms for both regions separately, using the fixed-effect specification: 
  
DEPGRi,j,t = αi +  λ t  +  β’ BANKFUNDi,j,t-1  +  γ’ AGG. BANKING j,t + 
δ’ MACROj,t   + Vi,j,t 




DEPGR represents individual bank deposits of bank i at time t in country j. N is the 
number of banks in each country. The panel is unbalanced, so T --the number of 
observations per bank-- varies across banks. AGG. BANKING represents aggregate 
banking variables, which capture potential contagion (spillover) effects of the banking 
system on individual institutions, while MACRO is a vector of macroeconomic variables, 
which vary across countries and time. BANKFUND is a vector of bank-level 
fundamentals. This vector is included with a lag, to account for the fact that balance sheet 
information is available to the public with a certain delay.  α stands for each bank’s fixed 
effect and λ stands for time dummies. Thus, according to the equation, bank deposits are 
determined by three main factors: the behavior of deposits in the overall banking system, 
the developments in the macro economy, and the evolution of bank-level fundamentals. 
In addition, I calculate the contribution of bank-level fundamentals relative to banking 
system and macroeconomic variables, using variance decompositions before and during 
the crisis period. 
 
In order to evaluate if depositors’ behavior during crisis times responds to bank level 
fundamentals as suggested by the market discipline hypothesis, I introduce a dummy 
variable for both regions, which takes the value of 1 during the crisis (panic) period: 
1997-98 for East Asia and 1994-1995 for Latin America. Then, I interact this dummy 
with the bank-specific fundamentals and evaluate if there are statistical differences in the 
coefficients between crisis and non-crisis periods. In the case of EA, the crisis dummy 
also captures the period where blanket guarantees (full protection for depositors and 




LA, Mexico has an implicit deposit insurance scheme covering the total amount of 
deposits; Venezuela has an explicit limited deposit insurance scheme covering up to US$ 
7,309; and Argentina introduced a limited deposit insurance scheme in April 1995 
covering up to US$ 20,000, which was extended up to US$ 30,000 in September 1998. In 
this sense, the crisis dummy for LA also evaluates depositors’ discipline in the presence 
of deposit insurance schemes. Before the onset of the crisis in East Asia, only Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan had an explicit deposit insurance scheme. In order to capture this 
effect, a dummy variable that take the value of one for these countries for the whole 
estimation period (since 1996 for Korea) was interacted with bank-level fundamentals. 
 
As a robustness check, I perform generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations 
(Arellano-Bover, 1995) to correct for potential endogeneity effects. If bankers are 
forward looking, they could anticipate that bank fundamentals at time t-1 affects deposits 
at time t . In this sense, banks may try to adjust their risk characteristics to prevent future 
deposit withdrawals, which would imply an endogeneity problem (Marinez-Peria and 
Schmukler, op.cit.). Also, I will consider as weakly exogenous banking and 
macroeconomic variables, even though we could assume that banking system and 
macroeconomic variables do not react to individual bank deposits.49 The data sources and 
variables are exactly the same as those used in chapter I. 
                                                 
49 See Appendix V for a detail presentation of the GMM estimator, in particular what are the 
instruments that will be used in the estimation, and the specification tests used to check if the 






A second way to approach market discipline is to analyze if depositors discipline bank 
risk taking by requiring higher interest rates. However, I will not pursue this approach 
due to the lack of adequate data on interest rates paid by each bank on deposits. I can 
only generate an implicit interest rate calculated as the share of interest rate expenses 
over the total amount of deposits, and not a market interest rate. 
 
3.3 Empirical Evidence 
Table 3.3 reports results from estimating the fixed-effects model of deposit growth for 
EA. Regarding bank specific fundamentals, FIs with higher ratios of capital, liquidity, 
profitability, and lower ratios of loan loss provisions and total loans to total assets, attract 
more deposits. 50 In this sense, depositors reassess bank specific risks given asset-value 
shocks. The variables that capture potential spillover effects, the measure of banking 
liquidity outside the FI and the ratio of net foreign liabilities to total international 
reserves, have the right sign and are significant in all specifications, implying that 
depositors were sensitive to the total amount of cash in the rest of the financial system 
relative to total deposits, and to the ability of the country to repay international investors. 
                                                 
50 Using another measure of ex-post asset quality, the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans, FIs 
with higher ratios of capital, liquidity, profitability, and lower ratios of total loans to total assets, 
attracts more deposits. This result provides a robustness test to our previous estimation results. F-
tests indicate that not only bank-level fundamentals, but also aggregate banking and 





Regarding the macroeconomic variables, real exchange volatility has the right sign 
(negative) and is highly significant in all specifications. Economic activity has the right 
sign (positive) and is also significant in all specifications. F-tests indicate that not only 
bank-level fundamentals, but also potential contagion and macroeconomic variables, are 
jointly significant.51 
 
In addition, I analyze depositors’ discipline during the peak of the crisis period (1997-
1998) in order to assess whether bank fundamentals explain deposit changes at a time 
when all crisis countries implemented blanket guarantees in order to prevent bank runs. 
Table 3.5 reports the interaction terms between bank fundamentals and a crisis dummy 
that takes the value of 1 in the period 1997-1998. According to the results, there are 
changes in the coefficients related to the ratios of total loans and liquidity to total assets.  
These coefficients have a higher absolute value during crisis years, implying that 
depositors care more about bank exposure in the loan market and the bank’s ability to 
repay deposits. There is no change in the coefficients related to solvency and 
profitability, implying that depositors show a stable behavior regarding these 
                                                 
51 In order to capture the effect of the explicit deposit insurance scheme in Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan, a dummy variable that took the value of one for these countries for the whole estimation 
period (since 1996 for Korea) was interacted with bank-level fundamentals. There were not 
significant differences in the coefficients of the loan to asset ratio, solvency, liquidity, and 
profitability measures. However, the loan loss provisions ratio was not significant for the 
countries with deposit insurance. This result would suggest that the presence of an explicit 





fundamentals. However, the coefficient on the loan loss provisions ratio is only 
marginally significant during the crisis period, which suggests that lagging variables 
related to bank asset quality do not convey relevant information to depositors during the 
peak of the crisis period. This may be a consequence of lax accounting practices in EA 
regarding loan loss provisioning and classification. 
 
The contribution of bank-level fundamentals relative to banking system and 
macroeconomic variables is shown in Table 3.6.52 The percentage of the variance 
generally explained by fundamentals is around 35 percent over the whole estimation 
period. However, during the peak of the crisis, the percentage of the variance explained 
by fundamentals drops to around 21 percent, reflecting the importance of aggregate 
shocks in the crisis period. 
 
Table 3.4 reports results from estimating the fixed-effects model for deposit growth for 
LA. Regarding bank specific fundamentals, FIs with higher ratios of capital and liquidity, 
and lower ratios of loss loan provisions and total loans to total assets, attract more 
deposits. As in the case of EA, depositors reassess bank specific risks given asset-value 
shocks. In addition, the variables that capture potential spillover effects have the right 
sign and are significant in all specifications. Real exchange volatility has the right sign 
                                                 
52 In order to calculate the percentage of the adjusted R-squared explained by specific 
fundamentals, once the fixed effects and time dummies have been removed, I run a regression 
with macroeconomic and potential contagion variables, then I add specific fundamentals and 




(negative) and is highly significant in all specifications. Economic activity has the right 
sign (positive) and is significant in all specifications. F-tests indicate that not only bank-
level fundamentals, but also potential contagion and macroeconomic variables, are jointly 
significant. 
 
Table 3.5 reports the interaction terms between bank fundamentals and a crisis dummy 
that takes the value of 1 in 1994 for Venezuela and 1995 for Argentina and Mexico. 
According to the results, there are changes in the coefficients related to solvency, 
liquidity, and the ratio of total loans over total assets, which continue to be significant, 
with the exception of solvency, with a higher absolute value in the case of the ratio of 
total loans and liquidity, implying that depositors care about bank exposure in the loan 
market and about the bank’s ability to repay deposits during the crisis. There is no change 
in the coefficients related to asset quality and profitability, implying that depositors show 
a stable behavior regarding these fundamentals. 
 
 The contribution of bank-level fundamentals to the variance of deposit growth is shown 
in Table 3.6. The percentage of variance explained by fundamentals is between 31 and 42 
percent over the whole estimation period, depending on specification. However, the 
percentage of the variance explained by fundamentals averages 22 percent during the 
peak of the crisis, reflecting an increase in the relative importance of aggregate shocks in 




estimation for both regions. Bank-level fundamentals individually and jointly explain the 





                                                 
53 In the case of East Asia, the coefficients of the loan loss provisions and return on assets 
variables are not significant, and in the case of Latin America, the return on assets is not 
significant. This could be related to the reduction of sample size, given that lags of the variables 
are used in order to generate the instruments in the estimation. However, the reduction in the 
number of observations, the results obtained in the fixed-effect estimation proved to be robust 




Chapter 4: Conclusions 
Bank-level fundamentals related to ex-ante bank asset risk, solvency, liquidity and 
profitability affected significantly the probability and time of bank failure in East Asia 
and Latin America. This result support the view that failed banks in the recent systemic 
crisis in Emerging Markets during the nineties suffered from fundamental weaknesses in 
their asset quality, liquidity, and capital structures prior to the onset of the crisis. In 
addition, macroeconomic and banking system variables explain the likelihood of failure, 
implying that aggregate shocks mainly unveiled prior bank weaknesses during the crisis 
episodes. 
 
Regarding the relative contribution of bank-level fundamentals, as opposed to systemic 
and macroeconomic factors, bank-level fundamentals explain around fifty percent of the 
probability of bank failure in East Asia and Latin America, which implies that there were 
many fragile financial institutions with particular ex-ante characteristics that made them 
more vulnerable to failure ex-post. In the case of East Asian crisis countries, there was 
little overlapping in the distribution of aggregate scores between failed institutions and 
non-failed institutions. This result implies that mainly the weakest institutions failed in 
the crisis countries, suggesting that the social costs of the unwarranted closure of solvent 
institutions (if any) must have been small. However, in the case of Latin American crisis 
countries, there was some overlapping in the distribution of aggregate scores between 
failed institutions and non-failed institutions in the crisis countries. These results imply 
that aggregate factors, affecting the banking system, are relatively more important in 




be forced to fail in the context of unexpected aggregate shocks to the system. The latter is 
consistent with the finding of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) that East Asia and Latin 
America have different regional patterns for banking crisis. Systemic banking crisis in 
Latin America had been more volatile and severe than those in East Asia. 
 
In terms of policy recommendation, the results suggest that financial system supervision 
should be strengthened, putting emphasis on not only traditional financial ratios 
associated to the CAMEL-rating system, but also market-based indicators (deposit 
interest rates), forming the basis of an early warning system. In addition, given that 
macroeconomic and banking system variables affect the probability and time of bank 
failure, financial regulators could rely on stress testing analysis as part of an financial 
assessment program in order to assess the vulnerability of a portfolio to major changes in 
the macroeconomic environment, making risks more transparent by estimating the 
potential losses on a portfolio. 
 
In East Asia and Latin America, a stable model of bank-level fundamentals explains the 
growth rate of real deposits even during the peak of the crisis periods. In this sense, this 
would suggest that depositors attempted to sort among ex-ante solvent and ex-ante 
insolvent banks in the presence of asymmetric information regarding the effect of shocks 
to the value of bank assets. However, in both regions, the relative contribution of bank 
level fundamentals during the peak of the crisis periods declined, implying that aggregate 




context, to some degree, the observed deposits withdrawals represented an informed 
market response to observable weaknesses in individual financial institutions.  
 
In terms of policy recommendation, these results open the door to the discussion at the 
policymaker level of the relevance of financial information disclosure by financial 
regulators in order to build up a more effective market discipline as a component of the 
regulatory framework. Financial regulators could rely more on elements of private market 
discipline (disclosure) as a complement of deposit insurance schemes, implying that the 
coverage of that schemes have to be limited in order to reduce depositors’ incentives for 
bank monitoring besides the moral hazard problems reflected in excessive bank risk 
taking. Financial institutions should release general types of public disclosure, including 
the capital held as a buffer against losses, risk exposures (credit, market, and operational 
risks), risk assessment and management processes, and the capital adequacy of the 
institutions, in order to allow market participants (e.g. depositors) to assess the bank 










Table 2.1 Mean Tests for East Asia  
 
I. Asset Quality
A. Full  Sample1/
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Loan Loss Reserves / Total Equity 11.35 13.35* 11.07 13.12**
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Equity 4.33 5.51 3.82 5.14***
Loan Loss Reserves / Total Loans 0.66 0.74 0.60 0.66
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans 2.04 1.92 1.94 1.72
Loans / Total Assets 62.10 70.38*** 63.47 69.74***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
B. Commercial Banks
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Loan Loss Reserves / Total Equity 10.59 14.49*** 10.40 14.06***
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Equity 4.03 5.97*** 3.97 5.59***
Loan Loss Reserves / Total Loans 0.60 0.82 0.62 0.76
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans 1.79 2.06 1.83 2.01
Total Loans / Total Assets 62.54 70.72*** 64.97 71.07***




VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Total Equity / Total Assets 12.37 9.17*** 13.77 8.32***
Total Equity / Total Liabilities 13.39 10.44*** 14.33 9.22***
Total Equity / (Total Liabilities + Off-Balance items) 11.55 9.34** 12.33 8.01***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
B. Commercial Banks
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Total Equity / Total Assets 12.59 8.45*** 14.65 7.96***
Total Equity / Total Liabilities 13.84 9.36*** 15.23 8.72***
Total Equity / (Total Liabilities + Off-Balance items) 11.92 8.30*** 13.23 7.60***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
   The sample of countries for East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
   The sample of financial institutions (FIs) is divided between failed and non-failed FIs. A financial institution is considered to have failed if
    it falls in any of the following categories: (i) The financial institution was recapitalized by either the Central Bank or an agency specifically 
    created to tackle the crisis or by a strategic investor; and/or required a liquidity injection from the Monetary Authority, (ii) The financial 
    institution’s operations were temporally suspended (“frozen”) by the Government, (iii) The Government closed the financial institution,
    and (iv) The  financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution.
2/ Commercial banks and Other Financial Institutions (Finance companies, Merchant Banks, Saving Banks, and Islamic Banks), totalling


















Table 2.2 Mean Tests for East Asia (concluded) 
 
III. Liquidity
A. Full  Sample1/
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Liquid Assets / Total Assets 23.31 16.93*** 22.23 17.46***
Liquid  Assets / Total Liabilities 26.98 18.70*** 24.43 19.01***
Due to Banks / Total Deposits 24.29 29.59 18.77 29.06***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
B. Commercial Banks
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Liquid Assets / Total Assets 23.58 18.08*** 23.13 18.74***
Liquid  Assets / Total Liabilities 26.89 19.78*** 25.25 20.34***
Due to Banks / Total Deposits 22.78 26.42 17.74 26.99**
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
IV. Earnings and Profitability
A. Full  Sample
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Net Interest Margin 4.06 3.44*** 4.11 3.38***
Return on Assets 1.62 1.07*** 1.60 1.01***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
B. Commercial Banks
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Net Interest Margin 4.52 3.87*** 4.47 3.68***
Return on Assets 1.62 1.06*** 1.68 1.07***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
V. Interest Rates and Deposits
A. Full  Sample
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Growth Rate of Deposits 19.34 18.05 18.24 17.48
Loans Interest Rate 14.73 15.01 14.81 15.57
Deposit Interest Rate 9.05 11.16*** 9.19 11.67***
Spread 7.19 4.96*** 6.93 5.64***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
B. Commercial Banks
Dec. 1995
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Growth Rate of Deposits 20.31 18.38 18.24 17.75
Loans Interest Rate 14.88 15.29 14.89 15.69
Deposit Interest Rate 8.67 11.18*** 8.96 11.80***
Spread 7.19 4.94*** 6.99 4.99***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
   The sample of countries for East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
   The sample of financial institutions (FIs) is divided between failed and non-failed FIs. A financial institution is considered to have failed if
    it falls in any of the following categories: (i) The financial institution was recapitalized by either the Central Bank or an agency specifically 
    created to tackle the crisis or by a strategic investor; and/or required a liquidity injection from the Monetary Authority, (ii) The financial 
    institution’s operations were temporally suspended (“frozen”) by the Government, (iii) The Government closed the financial institution,
    and (iv) The  financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution.
2/ Commercial banks and Other Financial Institutions (Finance companies, Merchant Banks, Saving Banks, and Islamic Banks), totalling











Table 2.3 Mean Tests for Latin America  
 
Commercial Banks 1/2/ 3/
I. Asset Quality
T-2 T-1
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Equity 8.58 8.61 7.32 9.69*
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans 2.05 1.35 1.92 1.70
Loans / Total Assets 47.21 54.14*** 48.62 55.46***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
II. Solvency
T-2 T-1
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Total Equity / Total Assets 14.65 13.49 14.86 12.56**
Total Equity / Total Liabilities 17.18 16.52 18.89 15.16**
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
III. Liquidity
T-2 T-1
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Liquid Assets / Total Assets 23.99 22.29 24.13 20.33**
Liquid  Assets / Total Liabilities 27.78 25.82 26.38 23.26*
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
IV. Profitability
T-2 T-1
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Return on Assets 1.31 1.01 1.07 0.14***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
V. Interest Rates and Deposits
T-2 T-1
VARIABLE NON-FAILED FAILED NON-FAILED FAILED
Growth Rate of Deposits 18.01 19.94 15.02 14.01
Loans Interest Rate 18.32 23.89*** 18.99 21.44**
Deposit Interest Rate 9.92 12.02** 10.51 13.03**
Spread 11.19 14.43*** 11.42 13.97**
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
1/ The sample of countries for Latin America includes Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
2/ The sample of financial institutions for Latin America only includes commercial banks because they cover a very high proportion (over
80 percent) of the financial system in terms of assets. There are 307 commercial banks in the sample.
The sample of commercial banks is divided between failed and non-failed banks. A commercial bank  is considered to have failed if
it falls in any of the following categories: (i) The commercial bank was recapitalized by either the Central Bank or an agency specifically 
created to tackle the crisis or by a strategic investor; and/or required a liquidity injection from the Monetary Authority, (ii) The commercial 
bank's operations were temporally suspended (“frozen”) by the Government, (iii) The Government closed the commercial bank,
and (iv) The  commercial bank was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution.
3/ T-1 represents Dec. 93 for Venezuela, Sep. 94 for Argentina and Mexico, Dec, 94 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. T-2 represents












Table 2.4 Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation for East Asia 
 
(Marginal Effects) 1/ 2/
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans -0.014 -0.014 -0.046 -0.008 -0.009 -0.028
0.860 0.868 0.635 0.884 0.883 0.619
Total Loans / Total Assets 0.012 ** 0.012 ** 0.010 ** 0.014 ** 0.014 ** 0.014 **
0.023 0.022 0.043 0.009 0.008 0.007
Total Equity / Total Assets -0.030 ** -0.028 *
0.052 0.087
Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.022 * -0.020
0.073 0.139
Total Equity / (Total Liab. + OBS.) -0.002 * -0.001
0.090 0.922
Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.010 *
0.066 0.067 0.075 0.087 0.086 0.067
Return on Assets -0.145 ** -0.148 ** -0.201 ** -0.153 ** -0.158 ** -0.217 **
0.055 0.051 0.006 0.044 0.041 0.004
Deposit Interest Rate 0.016 ** 0.016 ** 0.019 **
0.018 0.018 0.013
Spread -0.001 -0.002 -0.007
0.932 0.903 0.451
Log (Total Assets) -0.094 -0.088 0.038 -0.182 * -0.174 * -0.083
0.393 0.428 0.773 0.058 0.074 0.451
Indonesia 0.639 *** 0.640 *** 0.737 *** 0.608 *** 0.611 *** 0.699 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Korea 0.736 *** 0.738 *** 0.768 *** 0.770 *** 0.772 *** 0.791 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Malaysia 0.614 *** 0.618 *** 0.717 *** 0.565 *** 0.571 *** 0.680 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Philippines 0.507 *** 0.499 *** 0.410 *** 0.591 *** 0.583 *** 0.535 ***
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Thailand 0.641 *** 0.639 *** 0.662 *** 0.690 *** 0.688 *** 0.690 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. Obs. 385 392 387 385 392 387
Wald  Chi2 60.16 60.75 62.03 69.33 70.57 72.86
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall Predicted 80.87% 80.28% 82.55% 79.38% 79.66% 79.38%
Power
1/ The estimation was done including crisis and non-crisis countries in East Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
   The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution (FI) falls in the definition of failure given in Table 1 during the period Jan. 97-Jun. 99, and zero otherwise.
   Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1996. A constant term  was included in the initial estimation so the marginal  effects
   of country dummies have to be interpreted relative to  non-crisis countries.
2/ Marginal effects are reported rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the marginal effects. The Z-stat are based on robust (Huber 









Table 2.5 Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation for Latin America 
 
(Marginal Effects) 1/ 2/
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans 0.024 0.023 -0.030 -0.031
0.342 0.353 0.511 0.493
Total Loans / Total Assets 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 ** 0.006 **
0.002 0.003 0.029 0.033
Total Equity / Total Assets -0.019 *** -0.017 ***
0.001 0.004
Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.012 *** -0.011 ***
0.001 0.004
Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities -0.010 ** -0.010 ** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***
0.016 0.012 0.000 0.000
Return on Assets -0.107 ** -0.106 ** -0.131 *** -0.128 ***
0.013 0.011 0.000 0.000
Log (Total Assets) -0.103 *** -0.103 *** -0.089 *** -0.089 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Deposit Interest Rate 0.034 *** 0.033 ***
0.003 0.003
Spread 0.017 *** 0.017 ***
0.006 0.007
Argentina 0.644 *** 0.641 *** 0.647 *** 0.644 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mexico 0.773 *** 0.782 *** 0.853 *** 0.859 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Venezuela 0.630 *** 0.649 *** 0.893 *** 0.898 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. Obs. 275 276 275 276
Wald  Chi2 43.12 44.23 38.65 39.58
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall Predicted 76.92% 76.58% 74.65% 74.77%
Power
1/ The estimation was done including crisis and non-crisis countries in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and
   Venezuela.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution (FI) falls in the definition of failure  given in 
   Table 1 during the period Jan. 94-Dec. 95 for Venezuela, Dec. 94 - Dec.96 for Argentina and Mexico; and zero otherwise.
   Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1993 for Venezuela, as of September
   1994 for Argentina and Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. A constant term was included in the initial
   estimation so the marginal effects of country dummies have to be interpreted relative to non-crisis countries.
2/ Marginal effects are reported rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the marginal effects.
   The Z-stat are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors which account for correlated observations in grouped data.




Table 2.6 Survival Duration Model for East Asia 
 
Estimation Period: 1996-1999, Annual data1/ 2/
(1) (2) (3)
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans -0.358 * -0.360 * -0.528 *
0.079 0.077 0.060
Total Loans / Total Assets 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.031 ***
0.006 0.006 0.006
Total Equity / Total Assets -0.116 ***
0.002
Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.093 ***
0.002
Total Equity / (Total Liab. + OBS.) -0.040 **
0.019
Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities -0.032 ** -0.032 ** -0.030 **
0.016 0.017 0.024
Return on Assets -0.380 ** -0.382 ** -0.528 **
0.021 0.020 0.001
Deposit Interest Rate 0.018 ** 0.018 ** 0.018 **
0.425 0.407 0.412
Log (Total Assets) -0.526 * -0.527 * -0.365 *
0.075 0.074 0.101
Liquidity outside the bank 3/ -0.077 *** -0.078 *** -0.083 ***
0.001 0.001 0.000
Real Exchange Rate volatility 4/ 0.377 *** 0.374 *** 0.343 ***
0.003 0.003 0.001
GDP growth -0.162 ** -0.159 ** -0.211 **
0.033 0.037 0.007
Banking Sector Index Ratio 5/ -0.220 *** -0.217 *** -0.260 ***
0.008 0.009 0.002
No. Obs. 868 860 860
Wald  Chi2 136.38 134.07 118.81
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
p-Weibull 6/ 2.09 2.09 2.07
1/ The financial institution's time of failure is estimated by fitting a parametric (time-varying) Weibull distribution with
  monotone hazard rates for the period 1996-1999. The Huber-White robust estimator of variance is used to 
  calculate corrected standard errors. The Table reports estimated coefficients. If the sign of the coefficient is
  positive (negative), the variable is positively (negatively) associated with the financial institution's time of failure.
2/ The estimation includes crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) and non-crisis countries
  (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan).
3/ Total amount of liquidity relative to total deposits outside the bank, i.e., the amount of cash in vaults in the rest of 
  banks in the system (the summation over the n-1 banks) over the total amount of deposits in the rest of banks in 
  the system (the summation over the n-1 banks)
4/  The standard deviation of the monthly percentage variation of the real exchange rate index.
5 / The ratio of the banking sector stock index to the general stock market index.
6/ An exponential distribution was not estimated because  the maximum-likelihood estimator of p in the Weibull function 
   is not close to 1.




Table 2.7 Survival Duration Model for Latin America 
 
Estimation Period: 1992-1996, Annual data1/ 2/
(1) (2)
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans -0.191 ** -0.197 **
0.026 0.026
Total Loans / Total Assets 0.055 *** 0.059 ***
0.000 0.000
Total Equity / Total Assets -0.017 *
0.094
Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.012 **
0.033
Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities -0.057 ** -0.051 **
0.011 0.023
Return on Assets -0.162 ** -0.162 **
0.012 0.013
Deposit Interest Rate 0.071 *** 0.072 ***
0.008 0.007
Log (Total Assets) -0.401 *** -0.402 ***
0.002 0.002
Liquidity outside the bank 3/ -0.137 * -0.132 *
0.076 0.094
Real Exchange Rate volatility 4/ 0.073 *** 0.074 ***
 0.000 0.000
GDP growth -0.028 *** -0.028 ***
0.006 0.007
Banking Sector Index Ratio 5/
No. Obs. 594 587
Wald  Chi2 67.71 74.48
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
p-Weibull 6/ 2.88 2.90
1/ The financial institution's time of failure is estimated by fitting a parametric (time-varying) Weibull distribution with
  monotone hazard rates for the period 1996-1999. The Huber-White robust estimator of variance is used to calculate
  corrected standard errors. The Table reports estimated coefficients. If the sign of the coefficient is positive (negative),
  the variable is positively (negatively) associated with the financial institution's time of failure.
2/ The estimation includes crisis (Argentina,Mexico, and Venezuela) and non-crisis countries (Chile, Colombia, and Peru).
3/ Total amount of liquidity relative to total deposits outside the bank, i.e., the amount of cash in vaults in the rest of 
  banks in the system (the summation over the n-1 banks) over the total amount of deposits in the rest of banks in 
  the system (the summation over the n-1 banks)
4/  The standard deviation of the monthly percentage variation of the real exchange rate index.
5 / This ratio is not included due to data availability. Most commercial banks in Latin American countries are not listed in the
   stock market such that the banking sector index (if generated) only captures a narrow group of banks. The variation of 
  the general stock market index was not included because of their high correlation with the variation of GDP, which is 
  around 75 percent for the selected Latin American countries.
6/ An exponential distribution was not estimated because  the maximum-likelihood estimator of p in the Weibull function 
   is not close to 1.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3 Fixed-Effects Estimation for East Asia (1994-1999) 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Deposits1/
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag (Loss Loan Provisions / Total Loans) -0.011 ** -0.011 ** -0.011 ** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
0.014 0.013 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.003
Lag (Total Loans / Total Assets) -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lag (Total Equity / Total Assets) 0.008 ** 0.006 *
0.031 0.071
Lag (Total Equity / Total Liabilities) 0.005 ** 0.004 *
0.036 0.088
Lag (Total Equity / Total Liabilities + Off-Balance) 0.005 * 0.005 *
0.068 0.094
Lag (Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities) 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lag (Return on Assets) 0.018 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.032 ***
0.007 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lag (Total Assets) -0.781 *** -0.782 *** -0.786 *** -0.757 *** -0.759 *** -0.753 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Liquidity outside the Bank 2/ 0.007 ** 0.007 ** 0.007 **
0.048 0.047 0.050
Net Foreign Liabilities 3/ -0.108 *** -0.108 *** -0.124 ***
0.005 0.005 0.001
Real Exchange Rate volatility 4/ -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
GDP growth 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
0.027 0.027 0.025 0.013 0.013 0.012
No. Obs. 1108 1105 1105 1108 1105 1105
R-Squared 0.495 0.495 0.494 0.497 0.497 0.500
F-Model 80.69*** 80.64*** 80.40*** 81.57*** 81.49*** 82.14***
F- Bank-Fundamentals / excluding bank size 21.08*** 21.02*** 20.78*** 23.35*** 23.27*** 23.54***
F- (Macro & Agg. Banking variables) 58.97*** 59.19*** 58.97*** 60.63*** 60.68*** 61.84***
1/ Significance levels are below the coefficients in italics. Robust standard errors-White correction for heteroskedasticity are calculated.
   ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent. The countries included are: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
2/ Total amount of liquidity relative to total deposits outside the bank, i.e., the amount of cash in vaults in the rest of   banks in the system (the summation over the n-1 banks)
   over the total amount of deposits in the rest of banks in   the system (the summation over the n-1 banks).
3/ International liquidity risk is proxied by the ratio of Bank and Other Financial Institutions’ Net Foreign Liabilities / Net International Reserves.













Table 3.4 Fixed-Effects Estimation for Latin America (1992-1996) 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Deposits 1/
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag (Loss Loan Provisions / Total Loans) -1.973 ** -2.060 ** -1.613 * -1.686 *
0.057 0.048 0.097 0.084
Lag (Total Loans / Total Assets) -0.540 *** -0.556 *** -0.326 * -0.339 *
0.003 0.002 0.067 0.058
Lag (Total Equity / Total Assets) 1.239 *** 0.836 **
0.004 0.044
Lag (Total Equity / Total Liabilities) 0.824 *** 0.536 **
0.004 0.050
Lag (Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities) 0.006 * 0.011 * 0.079 * 0.089 *
0.098 0.095 0.066 0.063
Lag (Return on Assets) 0.282 0.342 0.199 0.254
0.296 0.212 0.444 0.336
Lag (Total Assets) -0.271 *** -0.280 *** -0.246 *** -0.256 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Liquidity outside the Bank 2/ 0.710 *** 0.706 ***
0.002 0.002
Net Foreign Liabilities 3/ -0.826 *** -0.823 ***
0.000 0.000
Real Exchange Rate volatility 4/ -0.240 * -0.243 * -0.373 *** -0.374 ***
0.078 0.075 0.002 0.003
GDP growth 0.245 *** 0.243 *** 0.157 *** 0.155 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. Obs. 596 592 596 592
R-Squared 0.456 0.456 0.505 0.505
F-Model 21.24*** 22.01*** 26.65*** 26.43***
F- Bank-Fundamentals / excluding bank size 4.99*** 5.11*** 2.56** 2.61**
F- (Macro & Agg. Banking variables) 21.94*** 21.42*** 32.73*** 32.02***
1/ Significance levels are below the coefficients in italics. Robust standard errors-White correction for heteroskedasticity are calculated.
   ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent. The countries included are Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.
2/ Total amount of liquidity relative to total deposits outside the bank, i.e., the amount of cash in vaults in the rest of   banks in the system
    (the summation over the n-1 banks) over the total amount of deposits in the rest of banks in   the system (the summation over the n-1 banks).
3/ International liquidity risk is proxied by the ratio of Bank and Other Financial Institutions’ Net Foreign Liabilities to Net International Reserves.











Table 3.5 Stability of Parameters During the Crisis Period 
 
Lag (Bank-level fundamentals) * Crisis Dummy 1/ East Asia Latin America
Loss Loan Provisions / Total Customer Loans 0.449 -0.038
0.013 0.982
Total Loans / Total Assets -0.004 -0.271
0.000 0.000
Total Equity / Total Liabilities 0.000 -0.521
0.918 0.013
Liquid Assets / Total Assets -0.003 -0.445
0.033 0.004
Return on Assets -0.003 1.422
0.844 0.414
Ho: All Interactions are equal to zero
F-Test 31.08 14.13
Prob. 0.000 0.000
MEMO: COEFFCIENTS DURING THE PEAK OF THE CRISIS AW7 2/
Lag (Loss Loan Provisions / Total Customer Loans) 0.030
0.105
Lag (Total Loans / Total Assets) -0.010 -0.591
0.000 0.001
Lag (Total Equity / Total Liabilities) 0.051
0.887
Lag (Liquid Assets / Total Assets) 0.014 0.413
0.000 0.006
  Bank-level fundamentals are interacted with a crisis dummy that takes the value of 1 for the years 1997 and
  1998 in the case of East Asia, and the value of 1 for the year 1994 (Venezuela) and 1995 (Argentina and
  Mexico) in the Latin American case.
1/ The regressions used in this analysis are specification (2) form Table 1 for East Asia, and specification (2)
   from Table 4 for Lattin America. There were not qualitative changes using other specifications.







Table 3.6 Percentage of Variance Explained by Bank-Level Fundamentals 
 
 
East Asia ALL ESTIMATION PERIOD PEAK OF THE CRISIS
Total Equity / Total Equity /
Specification including: Total Assets Total Liabilities Total Liab. + OBS Total Assets Total Liabilities Total Liab. + OBS
Net Foreign Liab ilities 39.02 38.20 35.46 21.55 21.41 20.77
Liquidity outside the FI 34.72 34.16 30.45 21.55 21.49 20.83
AVERAGE 36.87 36.18 32.96 21.55 21.45 20.80
Latin America ALL ESTIMATION PERIOD PEAK OF THE CRISIS
Total Equity / Total Equity /
Specification including: Total Assets Total Liabilities Total Assets Total Liabilities
Net Foreign Liab ilities 32.02 31.87 22.18 23.06
Liquidity outside the FI 41.15 41.04 21.89 22.77
AVERAGE 36.59 36.46 22.03 22.92
Figures indicate the percentage of the adjusted R-squared explained by specif ic fundamentals, once the f ixed effects and time dummies have been removed.
A first regression is run w ith macroeconomic and potential contagion variables, then I add specific fundamentals and compute the percentage increase in the























Table 3.7 GMM Estimation (EA: 1994-1999; LA: 1992-1996) 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Deposits1/
East Asia Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag (Growth Rate of Real Deposits) -0.548 *** -0.546 *** -0.543 *** -0.323 *** -0.310 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lag (Loss Loan Provisions / Total Loans) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.316 *** -2.030 ***
0.928 0.970 0.981 0.000 0.005
Lag (Total Loans / Total Assets) -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.124 ** -0.044 *
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.064
Lag (Total Equity / Total Assets) 0.010 *** 0.459 **
0.000 0.015
Lag (Total Equity / Total Liabilities) 0.008 *** 0.244 **
0.000 0.017
Lag (Total Equity / Total Liabilities + Off-Balance) 0.008 ***
0.000
Lag (Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities) 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.368 ** 0.459 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000
Lag (Return on Assets) 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.104 0.117
0.713 0.593 0.309 0.150 0.129
Lag (Total Assets) -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** 0.037 *** 0.319 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Liquidity outside the Bank 2/ 0.003 0.003 0.004 1.793 *** 1.690 ***
0.455 0.380 0.285 0.000 0.000
Real Exchange Rate volatility 3/ -0.001 ** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.229 *** -0.207 ***
0.014 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.009
GDP variation 4/ 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.335 *** 0.338 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. Obs. 760 760 760 493 493
F-Model 205.33*** 207.70*** 216.92*** 255.44*** 273.02***
F- Bank-Fundamentals / excluding bank size 59.42*** 60.35*** 65.88*** 18.75*** 29.07***
1/ Significance levels are below the coefficients in italics. Robust standard errors-White correction for heteroskedasticity are calculated.
   ***, **, * indicate significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Regressions include only crisis countries in East Asia and Latin America.
2/ Total amount of liquidity relative to total deposits outside the bank, i.e., the amount of cash in vaults in the rest of   banks in the system  (the summation over the
   n-1 banks) over the total amount of deposits in the rest of banks in   the system (the summation over the n-1 banks).
















Appendix I: Description of the Logit and Survival Time Model 
 
A. Logit Model 
 
A qualitative response model is used in order to estimate the unconditional probability of 
the occurrence of distress as a function of a vector of explanatory variables, X, and a 
vector of unknown parameters, θ. The specific model is: 
Pr(Yi=1) = F[H(Xi, θ)] 
Where: 
Y is the dependent variable which takes the value of one if the financial institution has 
experienced distress and zero otherwise; 
 
F is the probability function, which has a logistic functional form, giving rise to the logit 
model: 
H  =  θ0 + Σj=1  θj Xij 
 
X is the vector of explanatory variables for the i-th individual financial institution; and θ 
is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The basic equation of the logit model to be 
estimated can be written as: 
 














I use as explanatory variables CAMEL-type variables associated with asset quality (the 
loan loss provisions to total loans ratio and the total loans to assets ratio), solvency (the 
total equity to total assets or liabilities ratio), liquidity (the liquid assets to total liabilities 
ratio), and profitability (return on assets). Also, I include the logarithm of total assets to 
proxy for the size of the financial institution. These variables are measured as of 
December 1996 for East Asia, September 1994 for Argentina and Mexico, December 
1993 for Venezuela, and December 1994 for Chile, Colombia and Peru. In addition, I 
include country dummies. 
 
B. Survival Time Model  
 
Given the question, what is the likelihood that an event will end the “next period”? The 
central concept is occupied not by the unconditional probability of an event taking place, 
but of its conditional probability. Survival time analysis allows us to determine the 
factors that explain the duration of a given state-in our case, the state of no distress. This 
duration is subject to random variations, and they form a distribution, which is generally 
characterized by three mathematically equivalent functions: the survival function, the 
probability density function, and the hazard function. 
 
The probability distribution of duration can be specified by the distribution function F(t)= 
Pr(T<t). The corresponding density function is f(t) = dF(t)/dt. In this context, the survivor 
function is given by: 
 





Giving the upper tail area of the distribution. The hazard function is: 
 
Λ(t) = f(t) / S(t) 
 
Which is the instantaneous rate of leaving the state of no-distress per unit of period at t54. 
The common distributions used in order to derive the hazard function are: exponential, 
Weibull, log-logistic and log-normal. 
 
When we introduce explanatory variables, the effect of regressors is to multiply the 
hazard function itself by a scale factor (proportional hazard specification). The 
interpretation of the coefficients of the explanatory variables depends on the 
specification, and the sign of the coefficients indicates the direction of their effect on the 
conditional probability. 
 
In the proportional hazard specification, the hazard function, which depends on a vector 
of explanatory variables X with unknown coefficients β and Λ0 λ, is factored as: 
 
Λ (t, X, β, Λ0) = Φ (X, β) Λ0(t) 
 
                                                 
54 A precise definition in terms of probabilities is: 
Λ(t) = lim Pr(t ≤ T < t +h | T ≥ t) / h, as h goes to 0. i.e., the conditional probability that a FI that 




Where Λ0 is the “baseline” hazard corresponding to Φ(.) =155. In this specification the 
effect of explanatory variables is to multiply the hazard Λ0 by a factor Φ which does not 
depend on duration t.  
A general specification of Φ is: 
 
Φ (X, β) = exp(X’β) 
 
So, the hazard function takes the following form: 
 
Λ (t, X, β, Λ0) = exp(X’β) Λ0(t) 
 
In the case of a Weibull distribution, which is used in our estimations, the “baseline” 
hazard assumes that Λ0(t) = ptp-1, where p is the shape of the parameter to be estimated 
from the data. A particular case of the Weibull function is the exponential hazard in 
which p=1. 
 
I use the same set of CAMEL-type variables, market-based indicators, and size of the 
financial institutions as in the cross-sectional logit estimation. In addition, I include 
banking system variables, liquidity outside the financial institution and net foreign 
liabilities, and macroeconomic variables, the real exchange rate volatility, GDP growth, 
                                                 
55 “It is common, and sensible, practice to measure the regressors so that Φ(.) =1 at the mean 
value of the regressors. Then Λ has an interpretation as the hazard function for the mean 




and a measure of the stock market. Banking system and macroeconomic variables are 












































Appendix II: Description of Data Sample 
 
Table II.1 BankScope Sample as of end 1996: Overview of the Financial System 
Category  Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Commercial 
Banks 




3 (0) 28 (0) 33 (0) 5 (0) 26 (1) 
Total 89 (20) 55 (1) 74 (14) 36 (7) 41 (1) 
Numbers in (.) indicate the number of foreign-owned financial institutions. 
Source: BankScope. 
 
Table II.2 Coverage of the BankScope Sample as of end 1996: In terms of Assets (%) 
Category  Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Commercial 
Banks 




58.0 58.7 62.5 60.2 89.6 
Source: BankScope and countries’ Central Bank statistics. 
 
Table II.3 Coverage of the BankScope Sample as of end 1996: In terms of Number of 
Financial Institutions (%) 
Category  Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Commercial 
Banks 




3 (2%) 28 (49%) 31 (55%) 5 (5%) 26 (27%) 
















Table II.4 Sample Frequency Distribution of Failed Banks 
 
East Asia 
 Sample Percent 
Non-Failed 306 68.9 
Failed 138 31.1 




 Sample Percent 
Non-Failed 201 68.7 
Failed 96 31.3 




Table II.5 Distribution of Failed Banks across Crisis Countries  
 
East Asia 
Category Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Failed 
Commercial Banks 


















Category Argentina Mexico Venezuela 
Failed 65 13 18 

























1. The financial institution was recapitalized by either the Central Bank or an 
agency specifically created to tackle the crisis; and/or required a liquidity 
injection from the Monetary Authority. 
 
2. The financial institution’s operations were temporally suspended (“frozen”) 
by the Government; 
 
3. The Government closed the financial institution. 
 
 




































Date of Failure Failure Code Bank Name Country
Nov-97 3 Andromeda Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Arya Panduarta INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Asia Pacific - ASPAC Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Bahari INDONESIA
Mar-99 4 Bank Bali INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank BIRA - Bank Indonesia Raya INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Bukopin INDONESIA
Jan-98 4 Bank Bumi Daya (Persero) PT INDONESIA
Aug-98 2 Bank Central Asia INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Central Dagang INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Dagang Dan Industri INDONESIA
Jan-98 4 Bank Dagang Negara (Persero) INDONESIA
Aug-98 2 Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 Bank Duta INDONESIA
Apr-98 2 Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia - BankExim INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank First Indonesian Finance and Investments Corporation - Ficorinvest Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Lautan Berlian INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Lippo Tbk. INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Mashill Utama INDONESIA
Aug-98 3 Bank Modern INDONESIA
Apr-98 2 Bank Nasional INDONESIA
Dec-98 1 Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) - Bank BNI INDONESIA
Apr-98 2 Bank Nusa Internasional INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Papan Sejahtera INDONESIA
Dec-98 4 Bank Pembangunan Indonesia (Persero) - BAPINDO INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Prima Express INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Putra Surya Perkasa INDONESIA
Dec-98 1 Bank Rakyat Indonesia INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 Bank Rama INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Sahid Gajah Perkasa INDONESIA
Apr-98 3 Bank Subentra INDONESIA
Apr-98 3 Bank Surya INDONESIA
Aug-98 2 Bank Tiara Asia INDONESIA
Aug-98 3 Bank Umum Nasional INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Umum Servitia INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Universal INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Hastin Internasional Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 JayaBank International INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Kharisma Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 PT Bank Niaga Tbk INDONESIA
Nov-97 3 Sejahtera Bank Umum - Bank SBU INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 Tamara Bank INDONESIA
Apr-98 3 Bank Pelita INDONESIA
















Date of Failure Failure Code Bank Name Country
Jan-99 4 Boram Bank KOREA REP. OF
Apr-99 4 Chohung Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Chung Chong Bank Ltd. (The) KOREA REP. OF
Apr-99 4 Chungbuk Bank Ltd KOREA REP. OF
Jan-99 4 Commercial Bank of Korea KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Daedong Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Donghwa Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Dongnam Bank KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 H&CB KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Hana Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jan-99 4 Hanil Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-99 1 Industrial Bank of Korea KOREA REP. OF
Sep-99 4 Kangwon Bank KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Kookmin Bank (Old) KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Koram Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jan-98 2 Korea First Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-98 4 Korea Long Term Credit Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jan-98 3 Kyungki Bank Ltd. KOREA REP. OF
Jan-98 2 Seoul Bank KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Shinhan Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Coryo Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Daehan Investment Banking Corp. KOREA REP. OF
Jun-99 1 Export-Import Bank of Korea KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Gyongnam Merchant Banking Corporation KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 H&S Merchant Banking Corporation KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Hansol Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Hanwha Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Feb-99 4 Hyundai International Merchant Bank HIMB KOREA REP. OF
1999 4 Hyundai Securities Co. Ltd. KOREA REP. OF
Jun-99 1 Korea Development Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-98 4 Korea International Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jul-99 4 LG Merchant Banking Corporation - LGMB KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Nara Banking Corporation KOREA REP. OF
Jul-99 3 National Livestock Cooperatives Federation KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Saehan Merchant Banking Corp. KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Samyang Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Shinhan Investment Bank KOREA REP. OF
Oct-98 1 AmBank Group MALAYSIA
Jun-99 4 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 BSN Commercial Bank (Malaysia) Berhad MALAYSIA
Jun-97 4 Chung Khiaw Bank (Malaysia) Bhd MALAYSIA
Oct-98 1 Oriental Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 RHB Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Sabah Bank Berhad MALAYSIA




















Date of Failure Failure Code Bank Name Country
Nov-98 1 AMMB Holdings Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Dec-99 4 BSN Merchant Bank BHD MALAYSIA
Jun-99 4 Hock Hua Finance Berhad MALAYSIA
Jan-99 4 Multi-Purpose Finance Berhad MALAYSIA
Jan-98 4 RHB Finance Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Southern Investment Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
1999 4 TA Enterprise Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 United Merchant Group Bhd. MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Utama Merchant Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Jun-99 4 Philippine Commercial International Bank - PCIBank PHILIPPINES
Jul-98 3 Mindanao Development Bank PHILIPPINES
Aug-98 3 Bangkok Bank of Commerce Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jan-98 2 Bangkok Metropolitan Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Dec-98 1 Bank of Asia Public Company Limited THAILAND
Aug-98 2 Bankthai Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jan-98 4 DBS Thai Danu Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Feb-98 2 First Bangkok City Bank THAILAND
Feb-98 2 Siam City Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Dec-98 1 Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Apr-99 4 Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank THAILAND
Aug-98 2 UOB Radanasin Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Apr-99 1 Asia Credit Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jun-97 3 CMIC Finance and Security PCL THAILAND
Aug-98 2 Dhana Siam Finance & Securities THAILAND
Jun-97 3 Finance One Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jun-97 3 General Finance and Securities Ltd. THAILAND
Aug-98 2 IFCT Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Jun-97 3 ITF Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-98 4 Krungthai Thanakit PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 Multi-Credit Corporation of Thailand PCL THAILAND
May-98 2 Nava Finance & Securities Public Company Limited THAILAND
Aug-97 3 SCF Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 Siam City Credit Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
May-99 1 Siam Industrial Credit Public Company Limited (The) THAILAND
Aug-97 3 SITCA Investment and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 SRI Dhana Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 Union Asia Finance Public Co. Ltd. THAILAND








Date of Failure Failure Code Bank Name Country
Dec-95 4 Banesto Banco Shaw ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 Banco Popular Argentina SA ARGENTINA
Jan-97 4 Banco Frances del Rio de la Plata SA ARGENTINA
Dec-96 4 Banco Cooperativo de Caseros Limitado ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 The Chase Manhatten Bank, NA ARGENTINA
Aug-96 4 Banco de San Juan SA ARGENTINA
Sep-96 4 Banco Tornquist SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Cooperativo de la Plata Ltdo. ARGENTINA
Dec-97 3 Banco Credito Provincial ARGENTINA
Dec-96 4 Banco de Credito Comercial SA ARGENTINA
Feb-95 4 Banco de Entre Rios SEM ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Tucumán. ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Monserrat SA ARGENTINA
Aug-98 4 Banco Rio de la Plata SA ARGENTINA
Aug-96 4 Banco de Prevision Social SA ARGENTINA
Nov-95 4 Banco Municipal de Parana SEMICFAI ARGENTINA
Apr-96 4 Banco Commercial del Tandil SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Cooperativo del Este Argentino Ltdo. ARGENTINA
Mar-95 4 Banco de Coronel Dorrego SA ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco de Junin SA ARGENTINA
Nov-95 4 Banco de Olavarria SA ARGENTINA
Mar-95 4 Banco Rural (Sunchales) CL ARGENTINA
May-97 2 Nuevo Banco de Azul SA ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 Banco Popular Financiero SA ARGENTINA
Apr-97 4 Banco Union Commercial e Industrial CL ARGENTINA
May-95 2 Banco del Noroeste CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 3 Banco Federal Argentino ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco Interfinanzas SA ARGENTINA
Feb-95 3 ACISO Banco CL ARGENTINA
May-97 4 Banco Platense SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco San Jose CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Cooperative Nicolas Levalle Ltdo ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco del Ibera SA ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco Coinag CL ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Nucleo CL ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco de las Comunidades CL ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco Noar CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Horizonte CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco Aliancoop CL ARGENTINA
Feb-95 4 Banco Nueva Era CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco VAF CL ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco Independcia CL ARGENTINA
Aug-95 3 Banco Integrado Departmental CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco C.E.S CL ARGENTINA
Feb-95 3 Banco de la Ribera CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Meridional CL ARGENTINA





Date of Failure Failure Code Bank Name Country
Jun-95 4 Banco Carlos Pelligrini CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco Nordecoop CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco Local CL ARGENTINA
Mar-97 4 Banco Coopesur CL ARGENTINA
Mar-95 3 Banco Feigin SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Asfin SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Provencor SA ARGENTINA
Feb-97 4 Banco Liniers Sudamericano SA ARGENTINA
Feb-96 4 Banco Baires ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco UNB SA ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Caudal SA ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco del Fuerte SA ARGENTINA
Feb-95 3 Banco Multicredito SA ARGENTINA
Apr-95 3 Banco Austral SA ARGENTINA
Nov-94 3 Banco Extrader SA ARGENTINA
Nov-96 4 Banco de la Cuenca del Plata ARGENTINA
Nov-94 4 Banco del Chaco SEM ARGENTINA
Dec-95 4 Banco de la Provincia de Formosa ARGENTINA
Jan-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Missiones ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Rio Negro ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco Provincial de Salta. ARGENTINA
Aug-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de San Luis ARGENTINA
Sep-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Santiago del Estero ARGENTINA
Nov-96 4 Banco de Mendoza SA ARGENTINA
1995 2-4 COMERMEX MEXICO
1995 2-4 Mexicano MEXICO
1995 2-4 M. Probursa MEXICO
1995 2-4 Centro MEXICO
1995 2-4 Confia MEXICO
1995 2-4 Banpais MEXICO
1995 2-4 Oriente MEXICO
1995 2-4 Obrero MEXICO
Jun-94 3 Maracaibo VENEZUELA
Aug-94 2 Venezuela VENEZUELA
Feb-95 1 Union VENEZUELA
Jan-94 3 Latino VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Metropolitano VENEZUELA
Feb-95 3 Italo Venezolano VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 La Guaira VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Construccion VENEZUELA
Sep-94 2 Consolidado VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Bancor VENEZUELA
Dec-94 3 Progreso VENEZUELA
Feb-95 3 Principal VENEZUELA
Nov-95 3 Andino Venezolano VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Barinas VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Amazonas VENEZUELA
Feb-95 3 Profesional VENEZUELA




Appendix IV: Robustness Check Excluding Mergers and Acquisitions of the 
Definition of Failure 
 
Table IV.1 Mean Tests between Non-Failed FIs and FIs Mergered or Acquired 
 
I. Asset Quality
East Asia Latin America
VARIABLE NON-FAILED M&A NON-FAILED M&A
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Equity 3.66 4.90** 6.85 7.81
Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans 0.61 0.54 1.76 1.08
Loan Loss Reserves / Total Equity 15.17 21.32**
Loan Loss Reserves / Total Loans 2.39 2.38
Loans / Total Assets 62.53 68.22* 53.37 69.23***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
II. Solvency
East Asia Latin America
VARIABLE NON-FAILED M&A NON-FAILED M&A
Total Equity / Total Assets 13.77 8.37*** 19.78 15.24**
Total Equity / Total Liabilities 14.33 9.45*** 19.74 17.51
Total Equity / (Total Liabilities + Off-Balance items) 12.33 8.24***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
III. Liquidity
East Asia Latin America
VARIABLE NON-FAILED M&A NON-FAILED M&A
Liquid Assets / Total Assets 21.45 17.54* 26.08 16.62***
Liquid  Assets / Total Liabilities 23.48 19.15* 24.43 19.45***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
IV. Profitability
East Asia Latin America
VARIABLE NON-FAILED M&A NON-FAILED M&A
Return on Assets 1.60 0.99*** 1.08 -0.18***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
V. Market Based Indicators
East Asia Latin America
VARIABLE NON-FAILED M&A NON-FAILED M&A
Growth Rate of Deposits 16.28 17.68 13.03 14.19
Loans Interest Rate 14.81 12.62*** 18.62 21.98**
Deposits Interest Rate 8.92 9.13 9.20 8.76
Spread 6.92 7.11 11.34 13.85***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at 1, 5 and 10 percent.
  The sample of countries for East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and

















Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 ***
0.008 0.011 0.023
Total Loans / Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.959 0.964 0.987
Total Equity / Total Assets -0.025 ***
0.000
Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.019 ***
0.000
Total Equity / (Total Liab. + OBS.) -0.015 ***
0.002
Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities -0.005 * -0.005 * -0.004
0.081 0.079 0.124
Return on Assets -0.090 *** -0.099 *** -0.104 ***
0.003 0.002 0.001
Log (Total Assets) -0.053 -0.055 -0.024
0.562 0.562 0.806
Indonesia 0.805 *** 0.806 *** 0.827 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000
Korea 0.700 *** 0.700 *** 0.723 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000
Malaysia 0.566 *** 0.569 *** 0.585 ***
0.010 0.000 0.013
Philippines 0.525 0.527 0.452
0.128 0.121 0.201
Thailand 0.863 *** 0.861 *** 0.856 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000
No. Obs. 335 342 337
Wald  Chi2 89.72 90.86 92.66
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
The sample of financial institutions (FIs) is divided between failed and non-failed FIs. A financial institution is considered to have
failed If it falls in any of the following categories: (i) The financial institution was recapitalized by either the Central Bank or an
agency specifically created to tackle the crisis or by a strategic investor; and/or required a liquidity injection  from the Monetary,
(ii) The financial institution’s operations were temporally suspended (“frozen”) by the Government, (iii) The Government closed
the financial institution.
1/ The estimation was done including crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) and non-crisis countries
 (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) in East Asia.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution (FI)
  falls in the definition of failure given in (1) during the period Jan. 97-Jun. 99, and zero otherwise.
 Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1996. A constant term was
 included in the initial estimation so the marginal effect of country dummies have to be interpreted relative to non-crisis countries.
3/ Marginal effects are reported rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the marginal
 effects. The Z-stat are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors which account for correlated observations in grouped








Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans 0.009 0.009
0.141 0.150
Total Loans / Total Assets 0.000 0.000
0.771 0.770
Total Equity / Total Assets -0.005 **
0.026
Total Equity / Total Liabilities -0.004 **
0.032
Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities -0.003 ** -0.003 **
0.036 0.042
Return on Assets -0.022 *** -0.023 ***
0.009 0.008




Mexico 0.371 * 0.390 *
0.066 0.055
Venezuela 0.581 *** 0.594 ***
0.001 0.000
No. Obs. 275 276
Wald  Chi2 41.71 40.79
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
The sample of financial institutions (FIs) is divided between failed and non-failed FIs. A financial institution is considered 
to have failed If it falls in any of the following categories: (i) The financial institution was recapitalized by either the Central 
Bank or an agency specifically created to tackle the crisis or by a strategic investor; and/or required a liquidity injection 
from the Monetary Authority, (ii) The financial institution’s operations were temporally suspended (“frozen”) by the 
Government, (iii) The Government closed the financial institution.
2/ The estimation was done including crisis (Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela) and non-crisis countries (Chile, Colombia,
and  Peru).  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution (FI) falls in the definition of failure given
  in (1) during the period Jan. 94-Dec. 95 for Venezuela, Dec. 94-Dec. 96 for Argentina and Mexico; and zero otherwise.
Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1993 for Venezuela, as of
 September 1994 for Argentina and Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. A constant term was 
 included in the initial estimation so the marginal effect of country dummies have to be interpreted relative  to non-crisis countries.
1/ Marginal effects are reported rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the marginal effects.
 The Z-stat are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors which account for correlated  observations in grouped data.




Appendix V: Description of the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
Estimation 
 
Generalized-Method-of Moments dynamic panel estimators control for unobserved 
country-specific effects, the endogeneity of explanatory variables, time specific effects, 
and the use of lagged dependent variables. Consider the following regression equation, 
 
yi,t - yi,t-1 =  (α-1) yi,t-1 + β' Xi,t + ηi +  εi,t                           (7) 
 
Where y represents the growth rate of real total deposits of bank i, X represents the set of 
explanatory variables (bank level fundamentals lagged one period, banking system and 
macroeconomic variables), η is an unobserved country-specific effect, ε is the error term, 
and the subscripts i and t represent individual banks and time period, respectively. The 
dependent variable in equation (1) is the period’s average growth rate. We can rewrite 
equation (7) as a lagged-dependent variable equation as follows, 
 
yi,t  =  α yi,t-1 + β' Xi,t + ηi +  εi,t                                                      (8) 
 
The usual method of dealing with the country-specific effect in the context of panel data 
has been to first-difference the regression equation (Anderson and Hsiao 1981). In this 
way the specific-effect is directly eliminated from the estimation process. First-
differencing equation (8), we obtain 
 




The use of instruments is again required to deal with two issues: first, the likely 
endogeneity of explanatory variables, X; and, second, the new error term, εi,t - εi,t-1 is 
correlated with the differenced lagged dependent variable, yi,t-1 - yi,t-2. This second issue 
arises by construction when we difference equation (8). To address this correlation and 
the endogeneity problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose using the lagged values of 
the explanatory variables in levels as instruments. 
 
We would like to relax the assumption that all the explanatory variables are strictly 
exogenous (that is, that they are uncorrelated with the error term at all leads and lags). 
Relaxing this assumption allows for the possibility of simultaneity and reverse causality, 
which are very likely present in growth regressions. We adopt the assumption of weak 
exogeneity of the explanatory variables, in the sense that they are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term. This weaker assumption means 
that current explanatory variables may be affected by past and current growth rates but 
not by future ones.  
 
Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, ε, is not serially correlated, and (b) the 
explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions apply 
to the lagged dependent variable and the set of explanatory variables: 
E[yi,t-s * (εi,t - εi,t-1)] = 0  for s ≥ 2; t= 3, ..., T               (10) 
 





Using these moment conditions, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a two-step GMM 
estimator. In the first step, the error terms are assumed to be both independent and 
homoskedastic, across countries and over time. In the second step, the residuals obtained 
in the first step are used to construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance 
matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity. We refer to 
this estimator as the difference estimator. 
 
There are, however conceptual and statistical shortcomings with this estimator. 
Conceptually, we would like to study not only the time-series relationship between bank-
level fundamentals and the growth rate of real deposits but also their cross-sectional 
relationship, which is eliminated in the case of the simple difference estimator. 
Statistically, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1996) and Blundell and Bond (1997) show 
that when the lagged dependent and the explanatory variables are persistent over time, 
lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation in 
differences. The instruments' weakness has repercussions on both the asymptotic and 
small-sample performance of the difference estimator. As the variables' persistence 
increases, the asymptotic variance of the coefficients obtained with the difference 
estimator rises (that is, the asymptotic precision of this estimator deteriorates). 
Furthermore, Monte Carlo experiments show that the weakness of the instruments 
produced biased coefficients in small samples. This bias is exacerbated with the variables' 
over time persistence, the importance of the specific-effect, and the smallness of the time 
series dimension. To confront these conceptual and statistical concerns, we use 




Blundell and Bond (1997) suggest the use of Arellano and Bover's (1995) system 
estimator that-- based on asymptotic and small sample properties-- reduces the potential 
biases and imprecision associated with the usual difference estimator. Arellano and Bover 
(1995) present an estimator that combines, in a system, the regression in differences with 
the regression in levels. The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as 
above (i.e., the lagged levels of the corresponding variable), so that, the moment 
conditions in equations (10) and (11) apply to this first part of the system. The 
instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding 
variables. These are appropriate instruments under the following additional assumption: 
although there may be correlation between the levels of the right-hand side variables and 
the country-specific effect in equation (8), there is no correlation between the differences 
of these variables and the country-specific effect. This assumption results from the 
following stationarity property, 
 
E[yi,t+p * ηi ] = E[yi,t+p * ηi ]               (12) 
 E[Xi,t+p * ηi ] = E[yi,t+q * ηi ]      for all p and q 
 
Therefore, the additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the 
regression in levels) are given by the following equations: 
 
E[ (yi,t-s - yi,t-s-1) * (ηi  +  εi,t)] = 0   for s = 1                 (13) 
 




Thus, we use the moment conditions presented in equations (10), (11), (13), and (14) and 
employ a GMM procedure to generate consistent and efficient estimates of the 
parameters of interest (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the growth 
rate of real deposits and other explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth 
regression. To address this issue, I consider two specification tests suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover  (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997). The first is 
a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the 
instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation process. The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term εi,t is not 
serially correlated. In the both the difference regression and the system difference-level 
regression we test whether the differenced error term is second-order serially correlated 
(by construction, it is likely that this differenced error term be first-order serially 
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